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Confronting Mexico's Enforced
Disappearance Monsters: How the
ICC Can Contribute to the Process
of Realizing Criminal Justice
Reform in Mexico
Rodol/o D. Saenz*
ABSTRACT

In 2015, the United Nations Committee on Enforced
Disappearances released a report on Mexico, concluding that
there is a generalized context of disappearances in the country,
many of which would meet the legal definition of enforced
disappearance. Despite the recurring pattern of mass
disappearances throughout the country in the last decade,
including the recent disappearance of forty-three students in
Iguala, Mexico has not convicted a single person for an enforced
disappearance committed after 2006. Equally appalling is the
fact that 40 percent of missing person cases in the country never
get opened. Mexico has begun a process of reforming its criminal
justice system, but a lack of marked progress has largely
prevented the country from adequately addressingthis impunity.
This Article will argue in favor of pursuingan investigation
at the International Criminal Court (ICC). It will demonstrate
that, if the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) were to open a
preliminary examination in Mexico, the OTP would likely decide
to initiate an investigation, even if enforced disappearancewere
the only crime considered. It will further argue that pursuingan
investigation would likely contribute to Mexico's reform process
through the OTP's use of positive complementarity, a strategy by
which the OTP supplements ongoing domestic criminal
proceedings in order to help ensure effective investigations and
prosecutions. Not only could the OTP use the threat of opening an
investigation to pressure Mexican authoritiesto enact reform but
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it could also adopt proactive measures to help accelerate that
progress. This Article will propose three innovative measures that
the OTP could use in Mexico as part of its positive
complementarity strategy to bringMexico closer to confronting its
enforced disappearancemonsters.
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I. INTRODUCTION
At least when your loved one dies, you know where they are, what
happened, you can eventually get used to it. We do not know what
monster we are fighting.'
-Reyna Estrada, wife of disappeared husband
A. Iguala
September 26, 2014 is now a date that holds much meaning for
the Mexican people. Just after sundown on that day, in the town of
Iguala in Guerrero, the local police surrounded three buses full of
university students from Ayotzinapa and opened fire. .During the

Tracy Wilkinson, Mexico's Drug War Disappearances Leave Families in
1.
Anguish, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/07/world/la-fgmexico-disappeared-20110307/2 [https://perma.cc/3GVC-WAPE] (archived Oct. 6, 2016).
2.
Ryan Devereaux, Ghosts of Iguala, THE INTERCEPT (May 4, 2015),
https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/05/04/how-43-students-disappeared-in-mexicopart-1/ [https://perma.ccV9DK-UQZU] (archived Oct. 6, 2016); Mexican Students

48

VANDERBIL T/OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 50:45

chaos that ensued, two dozen people were wounded, six individuals
were killed, and forty-four students were taken captive.3 The following
morning the body of one of the students was found lying on a street
with the skin from his face peeled off and his eyes gouged out. 4
Despite the subsequent discovery of several mass graves in the
area and several months of investigation, only one of the students'
bodies has been positively identified.5 The whereabouts of the other
forty-two students remain unknown. More than a hundred local
officials and drug cartel members have been arrested and charged in
relation to the incident, but no trial has neared completion. 6 As will be
discussed further in the next Section, the Iguala incident forms a part
of a larger pattern of ongoing disappearances and enduring impunity
in the country.
The events in Iguala triggered a serious debate in Mexico about
how much the state is involved in mass disappearances-one that
reflects the Mexican people's growing loss of confidence in the ability
of its criminal justice system to investigate and to prosecute the crimes

Missing After Protest in Iguala, BBC NEWS (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-latin-america-29406630 [https://perma.cc/TV4U-XRJJ] (archived Oct. 6, 2016).
3.
Oscar de Pablo, Iguala: Crimen de Estado, Crimen de Clase, EL MIRADOR
POLiTICO (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.gkillcity.com/articulos/el-mirador-politico/igualacrimen-estado-crimen-clase [https://perma.cc/XA22-AXND] (archived Oct. 6, 2016);
Devereaux, supra note 2.

4.
Rafael Romo, Slain Mexican Student's Friends, FamilyDemand Justice, CNN
(Nov. 6, 2014), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/11/06/worldlamericas/mexico-slain-student/
[https://perma.cc/XR42-ZGXL] (archived Oct. 6, 2016).
5.
See Francisco Goldman, Mexico's Missing Forty-Three: One Year, Many Lies,
and a Theory That Might Make Sense, NEW YORKER (Sept. 30, 2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/mexicos-missing-forty-three-one-yearmany-lies-and-a-theory-that-might-make-sense [https://perma.cc/8P3T-2SEW]
(archived Oct. 10, 2016) [hereinafter Mexico's Missing Forty-Three]; Francisco Goldman,
The Missing Forty-Three: The Government's Case Collapses, NEW YORKER (June 8,
2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-missing-forty-three-thegovernments-case-collapses [https://perma.cc/RMW2-9A2A] (archived Oct. 10, 2016)
[hereinafter The Missing Forty-Three].
6.
See Pedro Matias, Ordena Juez Ampliar a Oaxaca Btisqueda de los 43
Normalistas, PROCESO (May 18, 2015), http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=404678
[https://perma.cc/AA4T-SF76] (archived Oct. 6, 2016) (detailing an order by a judge in
the Fourth District granting a "juicio de amparo," staying proceedings until a more
complete investigation of the forty-three disappeared students is conducted); AMNESTY
INT'L, ANNUAL REPORT: MEXICO (2015/2016), https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/

americas/mexico/report-mexico/ [https://perma.ccYDX5-HKWV] (archived Oct. 6, 2016)
[hereinafter 2016 AI Report]; HUM. RTS. WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2016:
MEXICO, http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/mexico [https://perma
.cc/B7SA-4B2T] (archived Oct. 6, 2016) [hereinafter 2016 HRW Report]. For an
informative report on the events and ensuing investigations concerning the events in
Iguala see AMNESTY INT'L, "Treated with Indolence" the State's Response to
Disappearancesin Mexico (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/
amr4l/3150/2016/en/ [https://perma.cc/Z5VE-3MHB] (archived Oct. 6, 2016) [hereinafter
Treated with Indolence].
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7
that arise from the Mexican drug "war." In January 2015, former
8
Attorney General Murillo Karam publicly declared that, following the
gunfire, members of the Iguala municipal police detained the students
and turned them over to the drug cartel "Guerreros Unidos," all under
9
the orders of Iguala mayor Jos6 Luis Abarca. According to Karam,
after this transfer, members of the drug cartel slaughtered and
incinerated the students and tossed their remains into the San Juan
River.' 0 Karam proclaimed that this story was "the historical truth"
and that he was prepared to close the case."
Following these remarks, many individuals, including the
President of the Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion
of Human Rights (CMDPH), Luis Radil Gonzdlez, contested the
1 2
accuracy of the story, claiming that "Iguala is not a closed case,"
because they suspected greater collusion between the Guerreros
Unidos and federal officials.' 3 Indeed, they had reason to harbor such
beliefs: a 2014 investigative report, published by the Mexican
magazine Proceso, alleges that Karam's story was the product of
unreliable interrogations of captured members of the drug cartel,
14
deliberately calculated to confirm that story. In December 2014, a

Although referred to as a "war," it is still debated whether the violence in
7.
Mexico would qualify as a non-international armed conflict under international
humanitarian law. See, e.g., Andrea Nill Sanchez, Note, Mexico's Drug "War": Drawing
a Line Between Rhetoric and Reality, 38 YALE J. INT'L L. 467, 470-91 (2013).
8.
In March 2015, Karam was dismissed and replaced by Arely G6mez Gonzalez.
See Mexico: Six Months of Frustrationand Failure in Search For Missing Ayotzinapa
Students, AMNESTY, INT'L (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.amnesty.org/
en/latest/news/2015/03/mexico-six-months-of-failure-in-search-for-missing-ayotzinapastudents/ [https://perma.cc/M64H-KZMU] (archived Oct. 6, 2016).
9.
Patricia Ddvila, "Los NormalistasEstdn Muertos; Fueron Calcinados"-Murillo
Karam, PROCESO (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=394286 [https://
perma.cc/8VUT-TMSF] (archived Oct. 6, 2016); Kyra Gurney, Mexico Wraps Up Iguala
Investigation Amid Widespread Doubts, INSIGHTCRIME (Jan. 28, 2015), http://
www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/mexico-wraps-up-iguala-investigation-amidwidespread-doubts [https://perma.cc/XT34-6KDB] (archived Oct. 6, 2016).
10. Gurney, supra note 9; see also Andrew Russell, 19 Weeks ago, 43 Mexican
Students Disappeared. What Happened?, GLOBAL NEWS (Jan. 29, 2015),
http://globalnews.ca/news/1799545/19-weeks-ago-43-mexican-students-disappearedwhat-happened/ [https://perma.cclBB29-DB7V] (archived Oct. 9, 2016).
11. Devereaux, supra note 2, at 2.
12. Sonia Corona, Mexico's Top Human Rights Official Calls for ForcedDisappearanceLaws, EL PAiS (Mar. 26, 2015), http://elpais.com/elpais/2015/03/26/
inenglish/1427376260-734062.html [https://perma.cc/7H9C-M8V2] (archived Oct. 9,
2016).
13. See, e.g., Catalina Piccato, "It Was the State"- Frustration with Corruption
Grows in Mexico, COLUM. POL. R. (Dec. 21, 2014), http://cpreview.org/2014/12/it-was-thestate/ [https:/perma.cc[MW8A-4SPD] (archived Oct. 9, 2016).
14. Anabel Hernandez & Steve Fisher, La HistoriaNo Oficial: El Gobierno No lo
Reconoce, Pero Segin una Investigaci6n de Proceso, Fuerzas Federales Si Participaron
en el Ataque Contra los Estudiantes de Ayotzinapa, EL DIARIO (Dec. 14, 2014),
http://www.eldiariodecoahuila.com.mx/lomejordelaapro/2014/12/14/historia-oficial475018.html [https://perma.cc[PLK3-DL83] (archived Oct. 19, 2016); Damning Report
Claims Mexican Federal Police Participated in Disappearance of 43 Students,
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report authored by scientists from the Universidad Nacional
Aut6noma de M6xico cast major doubt on the supposed early morning
incineration of the students. 1 Not trusting the Mexican government's
investigative efforts, a delegation of the parents of the missing
students enlisted the help of several independent experts, including
the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team (EAAF) and the InterAmerican
Commission
on
Human
Rights-led
(IACHR)
Interdisciplinary Group of Experts. 16 Both of these entities have also
released reports questioning Karam's story and the government's
investigative efforts.17
On May 18, 2015, the same delegation of parents gathered at
Leiden University for a panel discussion about the disappearances in
Iguala.' 8 RomAn Herndndez, a lawyer from the Montafia Tlachinollan

HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 14, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/14/missingstudents-mexico n_6321866.html [https://perma.cc/R5RF-YR5Q] [archived Oct. 9,
2016). For the full report, see Anabel HernAndez & Steve Fisher, La HistoriaNo Oficial,
PROCESO (Dec. 2014), at 6, http://www.proceso.com.mx/390560/iguala-la-historia-nooficial [https://perma.cc/A2GT-TR9P] (archived Oct. 19, 2016) [hereinafter Proceso
Report].
15. Devereaux, supra note 2, at 2; Cientficos Consideran "Fantasiosa"la Versi6n
de PGR Sobre el Caso Iguala, ECONOMiAHOY (Dec. 12, 2014), http://
www.economiahoy.mx/politica-eAm-mx/noticias/6321943/12/14/Cientificos-mexicanosconsideran-fantasiosa-la-version-de-la-PGR-sobre-el-caso-Iguala.html#.Kku8Jw7RcEi9
Tr2 [https://perma.cc/SQA7-B76D] (archived Oct. 9, 2016) (concluding that much more
fuel would have been required to burn the bodies than contended by the Mexican
government).
16. Devereaux, supra note 2, at pt. 2.
17.
See, e.g., COMUNICADO DE PRENSA, EQuIPo ARGENTINO DE ANTROPOLOGIA
Forense (EAAF), RESUMEN EJECUTIVO SOBE INVESTIGACIONES EN EL BASURERO DE

COCuIA Y RIO SAN JUAN 1 3 (Feb. 9, 2016), http://centroprodh.org.mx/Resumen%20
Ejecutivo%208-2-2016_revision.pdf [https://perma.cc/X998-WYK2] (archived Oct. 9,
2016) [hereinafter EAAF Report] (concluding that there were no signs of a mass
incineration at the Cocula dump); INTERDISCIPLINARY GRP. OF INDEP. EXPERTS (GIEI),
INFORME
AYOTZINAPA:
INVESTIGACION
Y PRIMERAS
CONCLUSIONES
DE
LAS
DESPARICIONES Y HoMICIDIOS DE LOS NORMALISTAS DE AYOTZINAPA, at 307-31 (Sept. 6,

2015), http://redtdt.org.mx/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Informe-ayotzi.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4Y25-HVWF] (archived Oct. 9, 2016) [hereinafter GIEI REPORT]
(concluding that the students were not incinerated at the Cocula trash dump). For a full
list of the reports of these entities, see Analysis and Information on Mexico's Ayotzinapa
Case: A List of Resources Regarding Mexico's Investigation of the 43 Disappeared
Students, WASH. OFFICE ON LATIN AM. (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.wola.org/analysis/

-

analysis-and-information-on-mexicos-ayotzinapa-case/ [https://perma.cc/W26M-6SK2]
(archived Oct. 9, 2016).
18. "The Students from Ayotzinapa: Security, Citizenship and the Search for
Justice in Mexico," Klein Auditorium, Academy Building, Leiden University (May 18,
2015). For a video of the entire event, see PazEnM6xico Holanda - Paises Bajos
Collectivos, Ayotzinapa in Leiden University- Eurocaravanaen Holanda,YOUTUBE (May
18, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-r9kRtzTe9fA (last visited Mar. 29, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/Y3GR-XN4L] (archived Oct. 10, 2016) [hereinafter Ayotzinapa in
Leiden].
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Center for Human Rights,1 9 made the following statement on behalf of
the delegation:
[t]he Mexican government is investigating [the students] as a result of probable
connections with drug-trafficking . .. [it] practices the re-victimization of the
victims, in this case by attributing to the victim the reasons for [his or her]
victimization. This can deepen the distrust of those same victims in the judicial
institutions . ..

20

Indeed, the Mexican government has alleged that the Guerreros
Unidos had motives to apprehend the students: the students were
2
believed to be members of a rival cartel called Los Rojos. 1 Though,
there have been reports in the media that assert that at least one of
22
the students was also an active military officer.
Irrespective of which version of the events is correct, these
clashing narratives about the truth demonstrate why the Mexican
people have a growing loss of confidence in their criminal justice
system. Since Iguala, the Mexican population has begun to act more
visibly on its frustration with government corruption and the
impunity 23 in Mexico. For example, in June 2015, Jaime Rodriguez
became the first gubernatorial candidate in Mexican history to win as
an independent. 24 However, he was not the only independent to win in
that midterm election: independent and smaller party candidates took
key victories across the country, winning positions as local
representatives and as members of the lower house of Mexico's

19. Ayotzinapa Lleva Reclamos a Europa: BrigadaInicia Gira Por 12 Paises, CNN
(Apr. 16, 2015), http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2015/04/16/ayotzinapa-l1eva-reclamos-aeuropa-brigada-inicia-gira-por-12-paises [https://perma.cc/8DV5-LVYU] (archived Oct.
9, 2016).
20. Ayotzinapa in Leiden, supra note 18, at 36:50-39:40.
Gurney, supra note 9.
21.
22.
Compare La Sedena Confirma Que uno de los Desaparecidosde Ayotzinapa Era
Militar, CNN (June 19, 2015), http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2015/06/19/la-sedenaconfirma-que-uno-de-los-desaparecidos-de-ayotzinapa-era-militar [https://perma.cc/
3ME6-WUGH] (archived Oct. 9, 2016) (arguing that the assertion noted above has been
confirmed), with PadresNiegan Que uno de los 43 Alumnos de Ayotzinapa FueraMilitar,
CNN (June 22, 2015), http://mexico.cnn.comlnacional/2015/06/22/padres-niegan-queuno-de-los-43-alumnos-de-ayotzinapa-fuera-militar [https://perma.cc/B6W8-VZ5L]
(archived Oct. 9, 2016) (contesting the above assertion).
23.
This Article uses "impunity" as it is used in legal vernacular. Impunity,
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) ("[E]xemption or protection from penalty or
punishment.").
24.
Dudley Althaus, Independent Wins Mexican Governorship, WALL ST. J. (June
http://www.wsj.com/articles/mexicans-vote-in-tense-midterm-elections2015),
8,
1433692326 (subscription required) [https://perma.cc/VTQ3-XVQZ] (archived Oct. 9,
2016); Luis Pablo Beauregard, 'El Bronco', Primer GobernadorIndependiente de Mixico,
EL PAiS (June 3, 2015), http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2015/06/08/
actualidad/1433743475_944848.html [https://perma.cc/46UB-X9EL] (archived Oct. 9,
2016).
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Congress. 25 These victories are staggering considering the historical
political domination of Mexico's National Action Party (PAN) and the
more recent emergence of two other major parties-the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution
(PRD). 26 These developments signal the beginning of a new intolerance
towards corruption. The Mexican people are ready for change.
B. Legal Reform as the Response to Iguala
International institutions have also recognized the need for
change, particularly with respect to Mexico's criminal justice system.
In February 2015, the United Nations Committee on Enforced
Disappearances (UNCED) released its concluding observations on
Mexico, finding that there is a "generalized" context of disappearances
in the country. 27 The UNCED noted that the grave case of the
disappearance of the forty-three students illustrates the serious
deficiencies in the state's ability not only to search for the victims of
enforced disappearance but also to prevent, investigate, and impose
sanctions. 28 The UNCED made the following recommendations, among
others, to the State of Mexico:
(i)

adopt a general law regulating and facilitating the search for victims as
well as the prevention, investigation, and prosecution of the act at both
the federal and state levels;

(ii)

create and maintain a national register with comprehensive statistics
regarding victims of enforced disappearance;

(iii)

reform the federal and state criminal codes so that they uniformly
recognize the crime as autonomous from others and provide a definition
in accordance with the International Convention on Enforced
Disappearances; and

25.
See Daniel Hernandez & Rafael Castillo, Mexico Elections Update: 'El Bronco'
Rides Wave of Discontent to Big Win in Nuevo Leon, VICE NEwS (June 8, 2015),
https://news.vice.com/article/mexico-elections-update-el-bronco-rides-wave-ofdiscontent-to-big-win-in-nuevo-leon [https://perma.cc/LA72-3Y8V] (archived Oct. 9,
2016) (detailing the results of the midterm election).
26. See Yann P. Kerevel, Loyalty and Disloyalty in the Mexican Party System, 56
LATIN AM. POL. & Soc'Y 93, 99-100 (2014); Althaus, supra note 24 (explaining the
dominance of the three parties).
27.
UNCED, OBSERVACIONES FINALES SOBRE EL INFORME PRESENTADO POR
MEXICO EN VIRTUD DEL ARTIcULO 29, PARRAFO 1, DE LA CONVENCI)N
T 10 (Feb. 11, 2015), http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CED/Shared%20Documents/M
EX/INTCED COB MEX_19564_S.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9G2-UXAF] (archived Oct. 9,
2016) [hereinafter UNCED Report].
28.
Id. ¶ 10.
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guarantee both (a) that all state entities or agents that could have been
involved in a disappearance are investigated and (b) that those members
of civil or military security forces that could have been involved be
excluded from participating in such investigations, in order to ensure
that Mexican officials conduct exhaustive and impartial
investigations.29

Implied in the UNCED's recommendations is the idea that legal reform
may hold the key not just to combatting enforced disappearance but
also to combatting the corruption that facilitates its perpetuation.
There are other strategies for addressing the disappearances in
Mexico that could be borrowed from the larger debate about how to end
the violence in the country. For example, many legal scholars argue
that the ideal long-term solution to ending such violence is to eliminate
U.S. drug demand by having the U.S. government adopt changes in
0
U.S. policies concerning the criminalization of drugs.3 However, even
if all hard drugs were legalized in the United States, such a strategy
would probably not address the corruption at the heart of the violence,
as Mexican drug cartels would likely just expand their drug supply to
other countries.
Others argue that the extradition of drug cartel leaders to the
United States for drug-trafficking offenses could serve as an interim
solution until Mexico becomes more capable of apprehending and
prosecuting drug cartel members.3 1 Although extradition to the United
States may indeed impede drug cartel leaders from directing criminal
operations, 32 in the past this strategy has also led to the splintering of
33
cartels into smaller ones, thereby contributing to further violence.
What is more, the extradition strategy is not new: it has been utilized

29. Id. TT 16, 18, 20, 28. The Mexican government disputes the findings and
recommendations in the Committee's report, arguing that it does not "adequately reflect
the information presented or provide additional elements to reinforce the actions and
commitments that have been undertaken to address the challenges mentioned." Kyra
Gurney, Why Is Mexico Rejecting UN Findingson Disappearances?,INSIGHTCRIME (Feb.
18, 2015), http://www.insighterime.org/news-analysis/why-mexico-rejecting-un-findingsdisappearances [https://perma.cc/2A6P-EETX] (archived Oct. 9, 2016) (quoting the
Mexican government press release).
See, e.g., STEVEN W. BENDER, RUN FOR THE BORDER: VICE AND VIRTUE IN U.S.30.
MEXICO BORDER CROSSINGS 164-71 (2012).

&

31. Joshua S. Spector, Extraditing Mexican Nationals in the Fight Against
International Narcotics Crimes, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1007, 1011 (1998) ("Mexico
should extradite Mexican-national narco-traffickers high on the U.S.-extradition request
list.").
32.
Devin C. McNulty, The ChangingFace of ExtraditionsBetween Mexico and the
United States, 31 CHAMPION MAGAZINE 32, 37 (2007).
33.
See Walter Rodriguez, Mexico's Catch-22- How the Necessary Extradition of
Drug CartelLeaders Undermines Long-Term Criminal Justice Reforms, 38 B.C. INT'L
COMP. L. REV. 159, 186-87 (2015).
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throughout the Mexican drug war. 34 In 2014, Mexico extradited sixtysix individuals to the United States, representing a 22 percent increase
from the figures from the previous year. 3 5 Yet, the aforementioned
surge in enforced disappearances continued during that period,
suggesting that extradition alone is not enough.
As evidenced above, the current discourse on how to address the
escalating drug cartel violence in Mexico has been heavily focused on
transnational efforts by the United States and Mexico. Indeed, the
Mexican drug war should continue to be imagined as a problem shared
by the two countrieS 36-one that requires regional cooperation and the
use of a variety of strategies in tandem. However, the literature has
largely neglected the role of international criminal institutions in
addressing Mexico's challenges, in particular the ongoing enforced
disappearances and the vast impunity for such acts. Very few have
analyzed whether the legal criteria for the crime would be met in the
context of the drug war in Mexico or have proposed how those criminal
institutions could help address the current failure to adequately
prosecute the crime. 37 This Article seeks to fill those voids.
C. The Purpose of this Article
To address the Mexican government's pervading impunity for
enforced disappearances and the population's distrust of the domestic
criminal justice system, the Mexican government will need to enact
legal reform. However, the necessary changes will take time to
materialize. As suggested in the UNCED's report, Mexico has barely
made progress with respect to its enforced disappearance epidemic.
Until Mexico becomes capable of investigating and prosecuting the
crime on its own, any international interventions should concentrate
on aiding the reform process.
This Article makes the following original contributions to the
discourse regarding enforced disappearances in Mexico and available

34.
See Melanie Reid, Mexico's Crisis: When There's a Will, There's a Way, 37
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 397, 409 (2012) (describing extradition figures between 2006 and
2010).
35.
BUREAU FOR INT'L NARCOTICS & LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, VOLUME I: DRUG AND

CHEMICAL CONTROL 239 (Mar. 2015), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
239560.pdf [https://perma.cc/5U9N-RFKM] (archived Oct. 9, 2016).
36. Alan D. Bersin, El Tercer Pais:Reinventing the U.S. IMexican Border, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 1413, 1418-19 (1996).
37.
There are some very recent contributions. See, e.g., Justin A. Behravesh, 'Ta
Me Canse"- How the Iguala Mass KidnappingDemonstratesMexico's Continued Failure
to Adhere to its InternationalHuman Rights Obligations, 21 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 291
(2015); C. M. Zandbergen, Enforced Disappearances in Mexico's 'War on Drugs':
Prosecuting Former President Calder6n at the ICC? (Sept. 2012) (unpublished thesis,
University of Amsterdam) (http://dare.uva.nl/cgi/arno/show.cgi?fid=468798 [https://
perma.cc/LVG6-GTXV] (archived Oct. 9, 2016)).
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alternatives for aiding the country in addressing the problem. It will
argue in favor of involving the International Criminal Court (ICC),
particularly the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), in the process of
realizing criminal justice reform in the country. If the OTP opened a
preliminary examination in Mexico, not only would it likely decide to
initiate an investigation in accordance with Article 53 of the Rome
Statute,3 8 but the evaluative process leading up to that decision would
also likely contribute to the enactment of domestic reform. The OTP
could and should utilize positive complementarity, a strategy by which
the OTP supplements ongoing domestic criminal proceedings in order
to help ensure effective investigations and prosecutions. 3 Doing so
would exert greater pressure on Mexican authorities to adopt relevant
reforms and to accelerate Mexico's progress in addressing the impunity
on its own.
D. The Structure of this Article
This Article is organized into four parts. In Part II, it will trace
the emergence of the enforced disappearance problem in Mexico from
its origins in the wake of the Mexican drug war to its more recent,
generalized character. It will also highlight the lack of consensus
concerning how many victims of enforced disappearance there are in
Mexico. In Part III, it will outline Mexico's more recent efforts to reform
its criminal justice system, discussing its continued failure to
adequately prosecute the crime and explaining the underlying causes
of that impunity. That Part will conclude by arguing that the
combination of such impunity with the broader deficiencies in the
Mexican criminal justice system creates a feedback loop, whereby the
resulting lack of confidence in Mexican criminal institutions further
exacerbates the impunity.
Part IV will seek to dispel the claim that the initiation of a
preliminary examination concerning enforced disappearances in
Mexico would not lead to an investigation. To this end, it will proceed
through the different legal hurdles that the OTP would have to satisfy
in order for an investigation to come to fruition, paying particular
attention to contentious issues like the chapeau requirements for

38. Rome Statute of the ICC Article 53(1)(a)-(c), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July
17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute] ("In deciding whether to initiate an investigation,
the Prosecutor shall consider, [three factors: jurisdiction, admissibility, and the interests
of justice].").
39.
See Carsten Stahn, Complementarity:A Tale of Two Notions, 19 CRIM. L.F. 87,
104 (2007) [hereinafter A Tale of Two Notions] (describing the "essential feature of
'positive' complementarity"); OTP,PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY 2009-2012 5 (Feb. 1,
2010), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/66A8DCDC-3650-4514-AA62D229D1128F65/281506/OTPProsecutorialStrategy20092013.pdf [https://perma.cc/
QA5K-RSHR] (archived Oct. 9, 2016) [hereinafter OTP Prosecutorial Strategy]
(describing positive complementarity).
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crimes against humanity and the complementarity assessment. Part V
will draw on the example of the situation in Colombia to demonstrate
that the mere threat of an ICC investigation during the preliminary
examination phase could contribute greatly to Mexico's domestic
reform process. It will then propose three innovative and proactive
measures that the OTP could adopt as part of its positive
complementarity strategy that would exert added pressure on Mexican
authorities to enact crucial reforms.
II. THE RISE OF THE ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE EPIDEMIC
Before
explaining
the
impunity
concerning
enforced
disappearances in Mexico, it is important to understand the origins
and scope of the enforced disappearance epidemic plaguing the
country. In order to do so, it is first critical to review what generally
constitutes
an
enforced
disappearance.
Most
international
instruments define an enforced disappearance as some deprivation of
liberty, done by state agents or persons acting with the authorization,
support, or acquiescence of the state, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge that deprivation of liberty or to give information on the
whereabouts of the person, such that the person is left without recourse
to legal remedies or procedural guarantees. 40 However, as will be
further explained in Section IV(B)(ii), the legal elements of the
definition differ slightly among instruments.4 1
This Part will begin by providing a brief background on the
Mexican drug war and explain how the phenomenon of enforced
disappearance emerged as a consequence of the escalating violence.
Doing so will help illuminate the motives behind this commonly used
practice, which will be relevant for the subsequent legal analysis of the
crime in Part IV. This Part will then discuss the data, that is, what is
known about the generalized context of disappearances in Mexico, and
highlight the lack of consensus over the current estimates of the
number of enforced disappearances in the country.

40.
See International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, G.A. Res. 61/177, U.N. DOC. A/RES/61/177 (adopted Dec. 20, 2006);
Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons Article 2, 33 I.L.M. 1429
(entered into force Mar. 28, 1996) [hereinafter Inter-American Convention]; Rome
Statute, supra note 38, art. 7(2)(i).
41.
Compare Rome Statute, supra note 38, art. 7(2)(i) (requiring "the arrest,
detention or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence
of, a State or a political organization . . . with the intention of removing them from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time"), with G.A. Res. 61/177, supra note
40, pt. 1 art. 2 (including "or any other form of deprivation of liberty" and omitting
requirements for a particular time period and a specific intent); and Inter-American
Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons art. II, Mar. 28, 1996, 33 I.L.M. 1429
(requiring "the act of depriving a person or persons of his or their freedom," and omitting
requirements for a particular time period and a specific intent).
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A. The Drug 'War"
Drug cartels have operated in Mexico for nearly a century. 4 2 Many
Mexican drug lords began their careers by smuggling alcohol across
the U.S. border during the Prohibition era. 43 However, it was not until
the tail end of the century that these cartels really began to have
influence. Following U.S. counter-narcotics operations in Colombia and
the Caribbean during the 1980s and 1990s, Mexican drug cartels began
to produce drug supplies domestically and to leverage their strategic
position on the U.S. border for the purposes of smuggling.44 As a result
of these developments, Mexican drug cartels came to control both the
transportation side and the supply side of drug trafficking in North
America. 45
Despite the long-standing presence of drug cartels in Mexico,
there had been relatively little drug-related violence in the country
until the turn of the century. The PRI party's long-standing rule from
1929 to 2000 allowed for what some have called the "perfect
dictatorship." 46 The PRI's domination allowed for the flourishing of a
sustained "patron-client relationship" between Mexican government
officials and the cartels, whereby the officials assigned trafficking
routes and monopolies and protected cartel members from
47
investigation and prosecution in exchange for a share of the profits.
Such arrangements permitted the cartels to operate quietly in the
shadows while the government informally regulated the illegal
enterprise.
Although this sanctioned corruption helped maintain the peace
among drug cartels for many decades, it later became the country's
Achilles heel. In 2000, Vincente Fox became the first-ever Mexican
President from the PAN, ending the PRI's rule and with it the
arrangements described above. 48 It was in this changed landscape that

See IOAN GRILLO, EL NARcO: INSIDE MEXICO's CRIMINAL INSURGENCY 29-37
42.
(2011) (describing various drug cartels in Mexico over the past 100 years); Shannon
O'Neil, The Real War in Mexico: How Democracy Can Defeat the Drug Cartels, 88
FOREIGN AFF. 63, 66 (2009) (detailing the origins of the Mexican drug supply to the
United States).
43. See Luis Astorga & David A. Shirk, Drug Trafficking Organizations and
Counter-Drug Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican Context 14 (Ctr. for U.S.-Mex. Studies,.
Working Paper No. 10-01, 2010) (discussing the rise of Gulf DTO's founder).
44. GRILLO, supra note 42, at 63-64; O'Neil, supra note 42, at 66-67; Nill SAnchez,
supra note 7, at 470.
45. GRILLO, supra note 42, at 63-64; Nill SAnchez, supra note 7, at 470.
46. M. Delal Baer, Dispatch: MisreadingMexico, 108 FOREIGN POL'Y 138, 140-41
(1997); Kerevel, supra note 26, at 99.
47.
Tim Padgett, Day of the Dead, TIME (June 30, 2011), http://www.time.com/
time/printout/0,8816,2080608,00.html [https://perma.cc/L7PK-365U] (archived Oct. 5,
2016); GRILLO, supra note 42, at 34-35; Nill SAnchez, supranote 7, at 470-71.
48. Nill Sdnchez, supra note 7, at 470.
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the drug "war"49 began. In the absence of assigned trafficking routes,
the cartels began to battle over turf, which compelled them to adopt
more violent and aggressive approaches to securing the successful
transit of their goods. 5 0 They acquired paramilitary hit squads and
began employing unprecedented tactics, such as the use of heavy
weaponry and widespread attacks on police and government officials.5 1
Additionally, rather than seeking arrangements with government
officials to secure trafficking routes, the cartels began to use bribery
and extortion to infiltrate various levels of government. 52
The 2006 election of President Felipe Calder6n of the PAN only
exacerbated the drug-related violence. 53 As a response to the
escalating violence, his administration adopted a militarized approach,
deploying forty-five thousand military troops to the areas that had
been the major battlegrounds for drug-trafficking routes. 54 This
attempt to eliminate the drug cartels with force only compelled drug
cartels to retaliate with even greater force. 55 Consequently, what had
started as a war among drug cartels vying for control of the trafficking
routes expanded to a war that also involved fighting between members
of the Mexican armed forces and drug cartels.
With the election of the current PRI President, Enrique Pefia
Nieto, in 2012,56 many hoped and even expected that Mexico would
return to the "era of cosy deals with drug cartels." 5 7 However, it
appears that Pefia Nieto has largely continued Calder6n's strategy of

49.
Recall that whether the "war" in Mexico would qualify as an armed conflict
under international humanitarian law is still debated. See, e.g., id. at 470-91.
50.

See ED VULLIAMY, AMEXICA: WAR ALONG THE BORDERLINE 17-20 (2010)

(recounting anecdotes about drug trade violence in Mexico); Nill Sinchez, supra note 7,
at 470-71; Padgett, supra note 47.
51. VULLIAMY, supra note 50, at 20; Nill SAnchez, supranote 7, at 470-71.
52. Nill SAnchez, supra note 7, at 471.
53. Id.
54.
U.S.

LISA HAUGAARD ET AL., A CAUTIONARY TALE: PLAN COLOMBIA'S LESSONS FOR
POLICY
TOWARD
MEXICO
AND
BEYOND
1,
1
(2011),

http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/CautionaryTale.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2BBT-RQVJ] (archived Oct. 5, 2016).
55. See Steve Coll, Whose Drug War?, NEW YORKER (Nov. 9, 2011),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/whose-drug-war
[https://perma.cc/5WUA-5TU2] (archived Oct. 5, 2016) (stating that Mexico's murder
rate has increased since Calder6n's election).
56.
Tim Padgett, How Enrique PeiiaNieto Won Himselfand His Party the Mexican
Presidency, TIME (July 2, 2012), http://world.time.com/2012/07/02/mexico-election-howenrique-pena-nieto-won-himself-and-his-party-the-presidency/
[https://perma.cc/X6TXD2YD] (archived Oct. 5, 2016).
57. Rory Carroll, US Concerned Mexico's New President May Go Easy on Drug
Cartels, GUARDIAN (July 2, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/02/usamexico-president-drugs-cartels [https://perma.cc/9BMY-3ZJA] (archived Oct. 5, 2016);
Raf Sanchez, Mexican Election Raises Fears in Washington, TELEGRAPH (June 29, 2012),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/centralamericaandthecaribbean/
mexico/9365421/Mexican-election-raises-fears-in-Washington.html [https://perma.cc/
XXR8-G646] (archived Oct. 5, 2016).
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fighting the cartels. 5 8 The Pefia Nieto administration has achieved
some victories: seven of the eleven drug cartel leaders captured or
killed in the last six years were seized during Pefia Nieto's first two
years in office. 5 9 Although targeting the drug cartel leaders has indeed
played a role in breaking up large cartels, it has also resulted in the
emergence of more than eighty smaller drug cartels, all vying for
60
territory and influence.
Recent gains with respect to the level of violence in Mexico have
been modest. Since 2006, more than seventy-five thousand people have
been murdered in drug-related violence in Mexico, with more than
61
thirty-one thousand occurring during Pefia Nieto's term in office.
Although still moderately high, annual homicide levels have declined
since 2012. 62 For the second year in a row, the total number of
homicides in Mexico declined by 15 percent in 2014, with only an
63
estimated eight thousand deaths attributable to organized crime.
However, in 2015, this trend reversed, with the homicide levels
64
increasing by more than 7 percent.
Despite these recent advancements with respect to the violence in
Mexico, it is important to note that the savagery of such violence has
remained largely unaffected. In May 2012, forty-nine bodies were
found on the highway in the town of San Juan in Nuevo Le6n,
decapitated and with their hands and feet missing, next to a sign
65
In 2014, Mexican
marking the territory of the "Las Zetas" cartel.
soldiers killed twenty-two civilians allegedly belonging to an armed
gang in Tlatlaya. 66 Recent eyewitness evidence indicates that, after a
brief exchange of fire, several of those killed were extra-judicially
67
executed, even after surrendering. In May 2015, in a coordinated

58.
See Bryan Llenas, Drug Lords Falling Quickly in Mexico, as PresidentPeila
Nieto Follows Calder6n's Old Playbook, Fox NEWS LATINO (Mar. 5, 2015),
http://1atino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2015/03/05/new-face-same-war-pena-nieto[https://perma.cc/F3J3-KD7X]
following-calderon-playbook-in-mexico-war-on-drugs/
(archived Oct. 5, 2016) (commenting that high number of drug-related arrests under
Pefia Nieto administration mirrored Calder6n's strategy).
59.
Id.
Id.
60.
See KIMBERLY HEINLE ET AL., DRUG VIOLENCE IN MEXICO: DATA AND ANALYSIS
61.
https://justiceinmexico.org/wp(2015),
9-10
1,
2014
THROUGH

content/uploads/2015/04/2015-Drug-Violence-in-Mexico-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L3ZH-J4L8] (archived Oct. 5, 2016).
62. Id. at 7.
63. Id. at vi-vii, 10.
64. Roque Planas, 6 Things Going on in Mexico's Drug War that Matter More than
El Chapo, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/mexico-drug-war us_56a7995fe4b01a3edl23dbd9 [https://perma.cc/GNB6-T7TU]
(archived Oct. 5, 2016).
65.
49 Mutilated Bodies Dumped on Mexican Highway, CBS NEWS (May 13, 2012),
http://www.cbsnews.cominews/49-mutilated-bodies-dumped-on-mexican-highway/
[https://perma.cc/XF9Q-6SE5] (archived Oct. 5, 2016) [hereinafter 49 Mutilated Bodies].
2016 AI Report, supra note 6.
66.
67.

Id.
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display of strength by one of the rising cartels, six soldiers inside an
army helicopter were killed with a rocket-propelled grenade, and at
least fifteen other soldiers and police were killed in several shootouts
that took place throughout Jalisco that same day. 68
B. The Emergence of Enforced Disappearancesas a Byproduct
The phenomenon of enforced disappearances emerged in the midst
of this Mexican drug war. The militarized approach of the Mexican
government, in combination with the increased autonomy of and
competition among Mexican drug cartels, created a landscape marked
by escalating violence between the Mexican military and drug cartels,
and among the cartels themselves. 69 As described in the previous
Section, while the drug cartels fought for control and survival, they
increasingly employed unprecedented tactics, which prompted the
Mexican government to respond more aggressively in turn. 70 As part
of this back and forth, the disappearance of persons emerged as an
additional instrument of war.
Many of the enforced disappearances in Mexico are used
strategically to intimidate or to eliminate perceived enemies engaged
in the drug war. The Iguala incident was not the first time people were
abducted for those sorts of reasons, nor is it the first instance of mass
disappearance in Mexico. The First San Fernando Massacre is a prime
example. 71 In August 2010 (four years before Iguala), local police
unlawfully detained seventy-two migrants traveling by bus through
Tamaulipas. 72 After the police transferred the migrants to Las Zetas,
the cartel executed the migrants, believing them to be members of a
rival gang.7 3 Mexican authorities subsequently discovered the bodies
at a ranch, where they also found several mass graves containing the
remains of approximately two hundred persons.74

68.
Jo Tuckman, Mexico Declares All-Out War After Rising Drug Cartel Downs
Military Helicopter, GUARDIAN (May 4, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2015/may/04/mexico-declares-war-rising-drug-cartel-downs-military-helicopter
[https://perma.cc/J8A3-SHNP] (archived Oct. 5, 2016).
69.
GRILLO, supra note 42, at 205-09, 281.
70.
See VULLIAMY, supra note 50, at 20.
71.
The "Second San Fernando Massacre" occurred in 2011. Mexico's San
Fernando Massacres: A Declassified History, NAT'L SEC. ARCHIVE (Nov. 6, 2013),
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB445/ [https://perma.cc/BYQ9-C8BZ]
(archived Oct. 5, 2016).
72. Michael Evans, Mexico: Los Zetas Drug Cartel Linked San Fernando Police to
Migrant Massacres, NAT'L SEC. ARCHIVE (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www2.gwu.edu/

-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB499/
[https://perma.ccV5H6-V3SZ] (archived Oct. 19,
2016).
73. Marcela Turati, San Fernando-Ayotzinapa: Las Similitudes, PROCESO (Dec.
2014), at 16-19, http://www.slideshare.net/Monalisal234567/la-noche-de-iguala-elencubrimiento-proceso-1990 [https://perma.cc/UC2V-7B6T] (archived Oct. 19, 2016).
74. See Mexican Police Arrest Suspect Tied to Migrant Massacre, CNN (June 18,
2011), http://edition.cnn.com/201 1/WORLD/americas/06/17/mexico.massacre.arrest/
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A similar chain of events occurred in the municipality of Joaquin
Amaro in the state of Zacatecas. 7 In December 2011, local police
illegally detained ten men due to their suspected ties to organized
crime. 76 According to the two men who escaped, the detainees were
blindfolded, beaten, and interrogated." Security camera footage shows
that the police later handed eight of the detainees to armed, masked
79
men at a gas station.78 The eight men are still missing. Two months
before that, twenty men from Michoacdn, traveling on vacation, were
80
Their bodies
seized by gunmen and remained missing for weeks.
were subsequently discovered in a mass grave, and their purported
killers confessed that the victims had been mistakenly believed to be
part of a rival gang.8 1 The discovery of several other mass graves
throughout Mexico also evidences the pervasive use of disappearances
as a means for eliminating enemies. In 2009, Mexican police arrested
the infamous "Stew Maker," who confessed to disposing of at least
three hundred bodies over a decade by dissolving his victims in their
graves with acid. 82 The victims were believed to be rivals of the
Arellano Felix drug cartel. 83 In February 2014, an investigation by
Mexican authorities in Northern Coahuila led to the discovery of the
burnt remains of at least five hundred persons who were suspected of
84
being the family, friends, and acquaintances of rival gang members.
C. The (Un)Known Facts about Enforced Disappearancein Mexico
As a result of the absence of a national, comprehensive registry
regarding disappearances in general, approximating the exact number
of enforced disappearances in Mexico is difficult. 85 The Mexican
government estimates that 27,638 persons have disappeared in the

index.html [https://perma.cc/49PQ-8EWA] (archived Oct. 5, 2016) (detailing another
incident where local police unlawfully detained men and delivered them to Zacatecas).
75. Mexico: Crisis of Enforced Disappearances,HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 20, 2013),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/20/mexico-crisis-enforced-disappearances
[https://perma.cc/M9DR-69BR] (archived Oct. 5, 2016).
Id.
76.
Id.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
79.
Wilkinson, supra note 1.
80.
Id.
81.
Police Arrest the "Stew Maker" Drug Thug who Dissolved 300 Bodies in Acid,
82.
DAILYMAIL (Jan. 26, 2009), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1127328/Policearrest-Stew-Maker-drug-thug-dissolved-300-bodies-acid.html [https://perma.cc/6KWHCL2F] (archived Oct. 5, 2016) [hereinafter Stew Maker Article].
83. Id.
84. See Coahuila'sClandestine Grave Body Count Rises to 500, BORDERLAND BEAT
(Feb. 8, 2014), http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2014/02/coahuilas-clandestine-gravebody-count.html [https://perma.cc/R7AQ-DF56] (archived Oct. 5, 2016) [hereinafter
BORDERLAND BEAT Article] (describing the results of the investigation).
85. See UNCED Report, supra note 27, 1 18 (recommending that the state create
a comprehensive registry of missing persons).
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country since 2006 and remain missing. 86 There is reason to suspect
that the number of annual disappearances has increased in recent
years. In 2014 alone there were approximately 5,098 reported
disappearances in Mexico, 87 breaking the record set the previous year
for the number of disappearances in a given year by 584.88 Nearly half
of the 27,638 people who have disappeared went missing during Pefia
Nieto's term in office. 89
However, these estimates must be viewed with skepticism, as the
Mexican government has not been providing consistent estimates. At
the start of Pefia Nieto's term in 2012, his administration reported that
26,121 people had disappeared since 2006.90 In more recent years,
other Mexican institutions have provided vastly different estimates.
For example, in May 2014, the Minister of Interior, Miguel Angel
Osorio Chong, declared that only 8,000 people were still missing in
Mexico. 9' That same month, the National Human Rights Commission
of Mexico (CNDH) estimated that 24,800 persons had disappeared
since 2005.92 Even if one accepts the more recent 27,000 approximate
figure, the Mexican government did not explain how it arrived at that
number, who the victims were, where they came from, or, most
importantly, how many victims were abducted by drug cartels, state
authorities, or both.93

86.
2016 Al Report, supra note 6, at 250; 2016 HRW Report, supra note 6.
87. Mexico and Impunity: A Case Study from the 2014 Human Rights and
Democracy Report, Gov.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/case-studies/mexico-andimpunity (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/447P-XSWN] (archived Oct. 4,
2016).
88.
James Bargent, 2014 a Record Year for Disappearancesin Mexico, INSIGHT
CRIME (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/2014-record-yeardisappearances-mexico [https://perma.cc/9RX9-ZMUL] (archived Oct. 4, 2016).
89.
See Treated with Indolence, supra note 6, at 10 (reporting 3,425 disappearances
in 2015 alone).
90.
Mexico: Drug war has led to 26,121 disappearances,CBSNEWS (Feb. 26, 2013),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/mexico-drug-war-has-led-to-26121disappearances/ [https://perma.cc/96Y3-PX4Q] (archived Oct. 26, 2016).
91.
En Mexico Hay 8 Mil Desaparecidos:Osorio Chong, ARISTEGUI NOTICIAS (May
23, 2014), http://aristeguinoticias.com/2305/mexico/en-mexico-hay-8-mil-desaparecidosreporta-osorio-chong/ [https://perma.c/UEP8-H3C3] (archived Oct. 5, 2016). A month
later, Osorio Chong retracted his previous statement and claimed that there were 16,000
missing. Dulce Ramos, Hay 16 Mil Desaparecidosen Mixico, Asegura Segob, ANIMAL
POLITICO (June 17, 2014), http://www.animalpolitico.com/2014/06/16-mil-desaparecidosen-mexico-asegura-segob/#axzz3BRoUyMXm [https://perma.cc/76YS-NBWG] (archived
Oct. 5, 2016).
92. Victor Ballinas & Andrea Becerril, De 2005 a la Fecha Hay 24 Mil 800 Personas
Desaparecidos:CNDH, LA JORNADA (May 21, 2014), http://www.jornada.unam.mx/
2014/05/21/politica/003nlpol [https://perma.cc/6QFF-CEDT] (archived Oct. 5, 2016).
93.
Treated with Indolence, supra note 6, at 11; see also PBI Mexico:
Disappearances in Mexico, PEACE BRIGADES INT'L (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.pbimexico.org/field-projects/pbimexico/news/news/?no cache=1&txttnews%5Btt news%5D=4367&cHash
=eda9933b0f83f7dc327eld08759794ec[https://perma.cc/F3ZA-JF7H]
(archived Oct. 5,
2016).
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Human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provide
their own estimates as to the total number of disappeared. Some
organizations argue that there is reason to believe that as many as
as
the
government's
remain
missing,
individuals
200,000
approximations do not take into account the overwhelming number of
unreported disappearances. 9 4 Other organizations believe there have
been at least 30,000 disappearances that would satisfy the legal
95
requirements for the crime of enforced disappearance.
The fact that many disappearances go unreported is indeed
another impediment to reaching accurate approximations about
enforced disappearances. Less than 25 percent of enforced
disappearances are reported.9 6 In 2013, there were an estimated 4,007
enforced disappearances in Mexico. 97 But only 718 of those cases were
reported to the police. 9 Likewise, many cases of enforced
disappearance get misclassified as other offenses, such as abduction or
abuse of authority; many times persons are simply considered
"'missing" or "lost."99 Thus, it is difficult to estimate how many of the
total crimes in Mexico would meet the criteria for enforced
disappearance under international law.
Several human rights NGOs have made efforts to document cases
of enforced disappearance. In a 2013 report, Human Rights Watch
(HRW) identified several apparent perpetrators of enforced
disappearances, including drug cartel members, the Mexican Army
and Navy, the federal police, the state and municipal police, and gang
1 00
Of
members working in tandem with any of the above state entities.
the organization's 250 documented enforced disappearances between
2007 and 2013, more than 140 were committed either directly or

94. Michelle Garcia & Ignacio Alvarado Alvarez, Closer Look at Massacre in
Mexico Reveals Glimpse of Corruption, AIJAZEERA AM. (July 5, 2014),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/7/5/closer-look-atmassacreinmexicorevealsglimpseofcorruption.html [https://perma.ccIZRG4-4JPZ]
(archived Oct. 5, 2016).
95. Mauricio Torres, El Gobierno "Desaparecea Los Desaparecidos",Acusan las
ONG, EXPANSION, (May 24, 2014), http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2014/05/24/elgobierno-desaparece-a-los-desaparecidos-acusan-las-ong [https://perma.cc/2RM6-SY7P]
(archived Oct. 5, 2016).
Hdiman Rights Council, Rep. of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
96.
Disappearances, 1 32, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/58/Add.2 (Dec. 20, 2011) [hereinafter
UNWGEID Report].
97. Mexico Kidnappings Top 105,000 in 2012, But Few Reported, HUFFINGTON
POST (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/03/mexico-kidnappings
n_4036902.html [https://perma.ccISR8D-4HBF] (archived Oct. 5, 2016).
Id.
98.
99.
UNWGEID Report, supra note 96, 1 18.
100. HuM. RTS. WATCH, MEXICO'S DISAPPEARED: THE ENDURING COST OF A CRISIS
IGNORED 3-4 (2013), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
mexico0213_ForUpload_0_O0.pdf [https://perma.cclMVH6-DQ46] (archived Oct. 7,
2016) [hereinafter MEXICO'S DISAPPEARED]; see also UNWGEID Report, supra note 96,
¶ 26.
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indirectly by state agents. 10 ' In June 2013, the CNDH declared that it
was investigating 2,443 cases of disappearances in which it had found
evidence of involvement by state authorities. 0 2 These initiatives only
begin to shed light on the number of enforced disappearances in
Mexico.
III. THE ENDURING IMPUNITY AND ITS IMPACT ON TRUST

Despite what HRW has called "the most severe crisis of enforced
disappearances in Latin America in decades," 103 Mexico has only
modestly begun addressing the pervasive impunity for those acts. As
will be discussed further below, the country remains largely incapable
of investigating and prosecuting the crime, searching for victims, and
preventing future commissions of the crime. Although Mexico has
begun the process of reforming its criminal justice system overall, the
rate of progress remains slow, revealing a need for international
involvement.
This Part will begin by discussing the reforms that Mexico has
adopted within the last decade in order to improve its criminal justice
system in general. Then it will highlight how impunity towards the
crime of enforced disappearance has persisted despite these reform
efforts. It will also seek to explain the underlying causes for those
shortcomings, most importantly a recurring pattern of purposeful
impediments the completion of investigative and prosecutorial
proceedings. This Part will then examine the harmful impact that
those deficiencies have had on the Mexican people's willingness to trust
their domestic criminal justice system, and explain how that distrust
further contributes to impunity.
A. Some Progress:Mexico's Criminal Justice Reform Efforts
Mexico's criminal justice system largely followed the inquisitorial
model until the beginning of the twenty-first century.1 04 Under the old
system, public prosecutors brought criminal charges and oversaw
criminal investigations. 105 In making a decision, judges relied on
written reports authored by prosecutors, and evidence pertaining to

101. MEXICO's DISAPPEARED, supra note 100, at 3; see also UNWGEID Report,
supra note 96, ¶ 17.
102. HUM.
RTS. WATCH,
WORLD REPORT
2014: MEXICO
1
(2014),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related-materiallmexico_8.pdf (last visited Mar.
18, 2016) [https://perma.cc/27PV-ETBF] (archived Oct. 8, 2016).
103. MEXICO's DISAPPEARED, supra note 100, at 2.
104. See David A. Shirk, Criminal Justice Reform in Mexico: An Overview, 3 MEX.
L. REV. 189, 198-99 (2011); Gillian Reed Horton, Cartels in the Courtroom: Criminal
Justice Reform and its Role in the Mexican Drug War, 3 MEX. L. REV. 229, 241 (2010)
(noting that Mexico utilized a "strange hybrid system that was partially inquisitorial").
105. Rodriguez, supra note 33, at 168.
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the accused was sealed and kept from the public until the completion
of the case.10 6 This somewhat minor judicial role made it difficult to
question the quality of criminal investigations. 107 Despite a
constitutional guarantee enshrining the presumption of innocence,
most Mexican courts did not adopt the presumption in practice,
especially for the accused who were poor.10 8
In 2004, President Vincente Fox proposed a series of
constitutional and legislative changes to Mexico's criminal justice
system, including a shift towards a more adversarial model. 109
Although these reform efforts failed to pass in the Mexican
legislature,11 0 they sparked a national debate about reforming the
Mexican criminal justice system and ultimately inspired several
progressive Mexican states to adopt new adversarial procedures. I"
With added pressure from the U.S. Mrida Initiative, the Mexican
Congress adopted federal judicial reforms in March 2008.112
The 2008 reforms included several key elements, all which were
to be fully implemented by 2016. 113 First, they introduced new
adversarial procedures, including open trials with live public
proceedings and the use of probable cause as the basis for the criminal
indictment. 114 Second, they provided for stronger constitutional
protections for the presumption of innocence, guaranteed different
judges for each stage of criminal proceedings, and embraced new
requirements concerning adequate legal defense for the accused. 115
Third, the reforms strengthened the formal investigative capacity of

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Zachary J. Lee, Comment, Wrestling with Mexican Criminal Procedure:How
Law Schools in the United States and Mexico Can Team up to Rebuild Mexico's Criminal
Trial, 33 HOuS. J. INT'L L. 53, 62-63 (2010); Rodriguez supra note 33, at 168.
109. Shirk, supra note 104, at 202.
110. See Matthew C. Ingram, State-level Judicial Reform in Mexico: The Local
Progress of Criminal Justice Reforms 3 n.1 (May 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author) (indicating that the 2008 federal reforms to the criminal justice system were
initiated under President Vincente Fox in March of 2004).
111. CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43001,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM IN MEXICO: THE U.S. ROLE 4 (2013).

SUPPORTING

112. Id. at 4; Shirk, supra note 104, at 202, 219. For more information on the
substance of the M6rida Initiative, see Deborah M. Weissman, Remaking Mexico: Law
Reform as Foreign Policy, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1471, 1486-94 (2014) (developing
arguments regarding U.S. law reform projects as conditions of foreign aid through an
examination of the M~rida Initiative).
113. MAJORITY STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 112TH CONG., REP. ON
JUDICIAL AND POLICE REFORMS IN MEXICO: ESSENTIAL BUILDING BLOCKS FOR A LAWFUL

SOCIETY 9 (Comm. Print 2012); SEELKE, supra note 111, at 4. For a comprehensive
summary of the substance of the reforms, see Shirk, supra note 104, at 198-219.
114.

MATTHEW C. INGRAM, WILSON CTR., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM IN MEXICO:

WHERE THINGS STAND NOw 2-4 (2013), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/
files/IngramCrimProReformMexico_- Jan_- 2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/HW2F-XTJZ]
(archived Oct. 8, 2016); Shirk, supra note 104, at 203, 209.
115. SEELKE, supranote 111, at 5-6; Shirk, supra note 104, at 203, 210-13.
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police agencies to gather evidence and investigate criminal activity and
to cooperate with other units. 116 Finally, the reforms amended the
Mexican Constitution to allow for the sequestering of suspectsparticularly those suspected of organized crime-under arraigo, a
practice whereby suspects may be held for up to forty days without
criminal charges.1 17
Despite the progress that these reforms represent, they have yet
to be fully implemented at the federal and state levels, thus Mexico
continues to operate largely under its traditional system.1 18 As of June
2015, only four states had fully implemented the reforms and twentyfour states had partially transitioned to the new system.1 19 Likewise,
only slightly over half of the country's municipalities had implemented
the new criminal justice system. 120 One positive development occurred
in February 2014, when the Mexican Chamber of Deputies approved a
new National Criminal Procedure Code. 1 2 ' This new code obligates all
Mexican states to adopt the same procedures regarding investigations,
arrests, indictments, hearings, and sentencing.1 22
Mexico has also realized several notable improvements to its
criminal justice system outside of the 2008 reforms. For example, a
2011 constitutional reform expanded Mexico's human rights
obligations by taking into account those obligations contained in all
international treaties signed by Mexico. 123 The Mexican Supreme
Court subsequently held that all sentences of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) are binding on all Mexican judicial

116. SEELKE, supra note 111, at 5; Shirk, supra note 104, at 203, 213-15.
117. SEELKE, supra note 111, at 6; Shirk, supra note 104, at 203, 217-18.
118. Rodriguez, supra note 33, at 167-68.
119.

See OCTAVIO RODRIGUEZ FERREIRA & DAVID A. SHIRK, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

REFORM IN MEXICO, 2008-2016, at 26 (2015), https://justiceinmexico.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/10/151008FINALCOUNTDOWN
Full-Finallow-res.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UKP-ZVUX] (archived Oct. 8, 2016) (using a
map to illustrate where the states stand with regard to implementation of the "New
Criminal Justice System").
120. Id. at 29.
121. cmolzahn, Mexican Congress Approves New Unified Criminal Code, JUST. IN
MEX. PROJECT (Feb. 19, 2014), https://justiceinmexico.org/congress-approves-newunified-criminal-code-in-mexico [https://perma.cc/6NG6-QBL5] (archived Oct. 19, 2016).
122. Viridiana Rios, Justice in Mexico: The Mexican Drug War's Most Important
Change that Nobody Noticed, KENNEDY SCH. REV. (Mar. 26, 2014), http://
harvardkennedyschoolreview.com/justice-in-mexico-the-mexican-drug-wars-mostimportant-change-that-nobody-noticed/ [https://perma.cc/JCC2-Y4F4] (archived Oct. 8,
2016); Rodriguez, supra note 33, at 170. Note, however, that the code did not restrict
military jurisdiction in cases involving human rights violations committed by the
military against other military personnel. See Inter-American Comm'n on Human Rights
(Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.), Situation of Human Rights in Mexico 1 79, OEA/Ser.L/VI.,
Doc. 44/15 (Dec. 31, 2015), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/
Mexico2016-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UEP-8QWA] (archived Oct. 8, 2016) [hereinafter
IACHR Report].
123. Carlos Cerda Duefias, IncorporatingInternationalHuman Rights Standards
in the Wake of the 2011 Reform of the Mexican Constitution: Progressand Limitations,
10 SUR INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 37, 41 (2013).
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bodies and branches of government and that all of Mexico's judges are
obligated to take into account international treaties, even where the
plaintiff does not have legal recourse under these treaties. 124 Another
positive development is that several reforms to the Code of Military
Justice came into force in June 2014.125 These reforms exclude crimes
committed by members of the Mexican armed forces against civilians
from military justice jurisdiction. 126 Likewise, much to the satisfaction
of several human rights NGOs, in February 2014 the Mexican Supreme
Court limited the practice of arraigo to cases involving organized
crime-a crime falling under federal jurisdiction. 127
All in all, Mexico is making strides in improving and modernizing
its criminal justice system, but this process is taking time.
B. Mexico's Continued Impunity towards Enforced Disappearances
and the Roots Thereof
Notwithstanding the above reform efforts, a failure to adequately
prosecute enforced disappearances in the country has persisted. As will
be discussed further below, Mexico has made even less progress in
adopting specific reforms to address the roots of this impunity. As of
December 2015, not one person had been convicted for an enforced
disappearance committed after 2006. 128 Between 2006 and 2013,
Mexican authorities opened 99 investigations for the crime of enforced
disappearance at the federal level and 192 at the state level.129 There
have been six confirmed convictions at the federal level, but all for acts
that occurred before 2006.130 The most recent federal conviction was in
2010.131 The Mexican government did not report any convictions at the

124. Luna v. Cossio, Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SJCN], Record Number
912/2010, Agreement of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, for
the day July 14, 2011, ¶1 44-46 (July 14, 2011) (Mex.).
125. SEELKE, supra note 111, at 10.
126. MEXICAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MILITARY JURISDICTION REFORMS IN
MEXICO, BOLETIN INFORMATIVO NO. 54 (2014), https://embamex2.sre.gob.mx/eual

images/pdflfactsheets/013Boletin_54_ingles.pdf [https://perma.cclV6RM-FD45]
(archived Oct. 19, 2016).
127. Supreme Court Bans the Use of Arraigo at the State Level, JUST. IN MEX.
PROJECT (Feb. 26, 2014), https://justiceinmexico.org/supreme-court-bans-the-use-ofarraigo-at-the-state-levell [https://perma.cc/54CM-SEEZ] (archived Oct. 8, 2016).
128. Mexico: 'Disappearances'Response Falls Short, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 8,
2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/08/mexico-disappearances-response-falls-short
[https://perma.c/3MMU-3K5X] (archived Oct. 8, 2016) [hereinafter 'Disappearances'
Response Falls Short]; see IACHR Report, supra note 122, 1 118 (identifying six cases of
forced disappearances resulting in convictions: one each from 1977, 2002, 2003 and three
from 2005).
129. 'Disappearances'ResponseFalls Short, supranote 128.
130. IACHR Report, supra note 122, 1 118; Disappearances'ResponseFalls Short,
supra note 128.
131. IACHR Report, supra note 122, 1 118 n.153.
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state level to the UNCED in February 2015, which strongly suggests
that there had not been any.1 32
Even more startling, the underlying cause of this impunity seems
to be a general unwillingness among Mexican law enforcement and
public prosecutors to investigate and prosecute the crime.
Approximately 40 percent of all missing person cases have never been
opened.' 3 3 The investigations that are initiated have notoriously been
plagued by a number of shortcomings, mainly occurring at the
administrative level. A 2013 report by HRW identified several systemic
patterns of investigative failures, including:
(i)

unexplained delays in the initial follow up on reported disappearances;

(ii)

intentionally misinforming victims' families that the law requires a
person to have been missing for several days before a formal complaint
may be filed;

(iii) attributing blame to victims as a pretext for not opening investigations
(e.g., presuming that victims are involved in criminal activities);
(iv) routine failure to carry out basic investigative steps (e.g., visiting the
scene of the crime, interviewing key suspects or witnesses, and obtaining
the names of suspected police officers or soldiers implicated in the
disappearance);
(v)

excessive reliance on families to carry out crucial investigative steps,
which in turn puts the families at risk of threats and reprisals for their
involvement;

(vi) misplacement, suppression, or destruction of key evidence; and
(vii) fabricating evidence (e.g., claiming to have conducted several interviews
that never occurred).134

132. See UNCED, UNHCR, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 29, Paragraph1, of the Convention: Reports of States Partiesdue in 2012:
Mexico, 1 164, U.N. DOC. CED/C/MEX/1 (Apr. 17, 2014), http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/
layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CED/C/MEX/1&Lang=en
[https://perma.cc/E4A7-RQFB] (archived Oct. 5, 2016) (describing the six federal level
convictions); see also AMNESTY INT'L, MEXICO: SUBMISSION TO THE UN COMMITTEE ON
ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES 4 (2015), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/

AMR4100012015ENGLISH.pdf [https://perma.cc/ XX3N-T3P2] (archived Oct. 5, 2016)
[hereinafter A Submission] (noting limited state response to inquiries concerning
enforcement as well as limited compliance with international human rights standards).
133.

See AMNESTY INT'L, CONFRONTING A NIGHTMARE: DISAPPEARANCES IN MEXICO

10-11 (2013), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/AMR41/025/20i3/en/

(archived

Oct. 5, 2016) [hereinafter CONFRONTING A NIGHTMARE].

134. See MEXICO'S DISAPPEARED, supra note 100, at 5-6, 34-67 (explaining
authorities' investigative failures surrounding abductions). These investigative failures
are well documented and are substantiated by several other human rights bodies and
NGOs. See, e.g., IACHR Report, supra note 122, IT 121-27 (discussing failures in
addressing victims' complaints and witnesses' testimony); UNCED Report, supra note
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These patterns and the fact that so few cases of disappearance are
investigated suggest that many police officers and public prosecutors
are deliberately protecting perpetrators of the crime-that they want
these crimes to remain uninvestigated.
However, corruption is not the only factor contributing to such
impunity. Another factor is that the protocols for units investigating
the crime need to be updated. The Deputy Federal Attorney General's

Office Specialized in Organized Crime (SEIDO), which conducts
federal investigations into enforced disappearances, only has a
generalized protocol regarding such investigations. 135 Thus, the
protocol does not incorporate procedures for evaluating chain of
command and establishing "authorization, support, or acquiescence"
136
What is
by state agents-vital elements of the international crime.
more, the Specialized Search Unit for Disappeared People, a recently
created unit within the Attorney General's Office, does not coordinate
with SEIDO, resulting in a situation where the two entities conduct
simultaneous and redundant investigations. 137
At the legislative level, there is also a lack of uniformity among
federal and state definitions of the crime, which further inhibits
adequate investigation. Many international institutions have implored
Mexico to adopt a uniform definition that follows the definition in
international instruments. For example, in 2009, the IACtHR held that
Mexico's federal definition of the crime was insufficient to protect the
guarantees enshrined in the Inter-American Convention on Forced
Disappearances, as the federal law did not recognize the full gambit of
potential perpetrators or the different forms of participation that state
agents may have. 138 The court ordered Mexico to make the appropriate
modifications. 139 The United Nations Working Group on Enforced or
similar
a
made
(UNWGEID)
Disappearances
Involuntary
recommendation in 2012 and also called for the Mexican government

27, 1 27 (noting officials' failure to execute investigations efficiently, especially in their
failure to act upon information they received in a timely manner); UNWGEID Report,
supranote 96, 1 33-34 (articulating officials' omissions, delays, and lack of due diligence
in their investigations); Treated with Indolence, supra note 6, at 16-19, 34-36, 46-47
(discussing faulty searches for victims and improper investigations relative to
international standards); Al Submission, supra note 132, at 8-9, 13 (noting the Mexican
federal attorney general's failure to execute prompt, effective, and impartial
investigations).
135. See AI Submission, supra note 132, at 8 (asserting that SEIDO investigations
do not implement "a specialized protocol developed in line with international experience
in the investigation of enforced disappearances").
136. Id.
137. Cf. id. (arguing that the combination of SEIDO and Specialized Search Unit
efforts is "insufficient to ensure a rigorous investigation").
138. Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209, ¶¶
316-24 (Nov. 23, 2009).
139. See id. ¶¶ 343-44 (holding that "the State shall adopt all the measures
necessary to make that legal classification compatible with the international
standards").
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line with the international

instruments.140

Despite these recommendations, most of the problems outlined by
the IACtHR and UNWGEID remain unaddressed. The federal law still
does not contain a definition of the crime in accordance with
international law, resulting in the exclusion of a whole subset of
potential cases of enforced disappearance from being prosecuted. 141
The UNCED noted in February 2015 that some of the Mexican states
had still not codified enforced disappearance as a crime at all and that
those that had codified the crime did so with varying sentences for
enforced disappearance or did not follow the definition of the
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearances: 142 twelve Mexican states have failed to
incorporate the criminal offense into their criminal codes, 143 sixteen
states have laws with definitions for the crime that fall short of
international standards, 144 and only nineteen states classify enforced
disappearance as an autonomous crime distinct from similar crimes,
such as murder or kidnapping. 145 In December 2015, President Pefia
Nieto submitted a draft general law concerning enforced
disappearances, but, at the time of writing, no such bill has been
passed in Mexico's legislatures.1 46
That is not to say that Mexico has not made strides in addressing
the above shortcomings. Last year, at the legislative level, the Mexican
legislature passed La Ley del Registro Nacional de Datos de Personas
Extraviadas o Desaprecidas-a law setting up a national registry for
statistics about enforced disappearancel 47-an important step towards

140. UNWGEID Report, supra note 96, J¶ 13, 87.
141. See IACHR Report, supra note 122, J¶ 112-14 (noting the faults in the
definition that ultimately limit responsibility for the crimes and prevent a guaranteed
punishment); see also Al Submission, supra note 132, at 5 (asserting that Mexican
federal law fails to comply with the international definition of enforced disappearance
and fails to recognize all the ways in which public officials could be involved in enforced
disappearances).
142. UNCED Report, supranote 27, ¶T 19-20.
143. AI Submission, supranote 132, at 5-6; see also IACHR Report, supra note 122,
¶ 115, n.148 ("[TJhe Mexican government identified only 13 states whose local criminal
codes define the crime of forced disappearance.").
144. See Al Submission, supranote 132, at 5-6 ("Many of the remaining 20 states
operate laws that fall well short of the standard established in the International
Convention and the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons.");
see also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, MEXICO: COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES

FOR 2014, 3 (2014), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236914.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5DFY-ETEP] (archived Oct. 5, 2016) ("The federal criminal code and
the legislation of the 16 federal entities that classify forced disappearance as a crime do
not use the same definition, and penalties vary according to the jurisdiction.").
145. See IACHR Report, supra note 122, ¶ 115 ("As far as the 31 states and the
Federal District are concerned, the State has reported that 19 have provided for forced
disappearance as an independent crime in their criminal codes.").
146. Id. ¶¶ 116-17.
147. UNCED Report, supra note 27, ¶ 17.
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better cataloging the disappearances occurring in the country. At the
administrative level, in June 2013, the Mexican government created
the Specialized Search Unit for Disappeared People (SSUDP), which,
in principle, was supposed to support and coordinate investigations
and searches with state-level prosecutor offices and other agencies. 4 8
By June 2014, the unit had conducted searches for approximately 1,200
missing people and had located 380.149
At the judicial level, the Mexican Supreme Court has held that all
Mexican judicial bodies are bound by the decisions of the IACtHR,
including those concerning enforced disappearance. 150 As previously
mentioned, in 2014, Mexico abolished military jurisdiction for human
rights violations committed by military personnel against civilians, 15 1
including enforced disappearance, thereby eliminating one avenue
through which military perpetrators could avoid prosecution.
In light of the above, it would seem that Mexico has tried to make
progress with respect to the impunity for enforced disappearances, but
the general patterns identified in the HRW report strongly suggest
that many Mexican authorities are actually impeding progress and
avoiding investigation in order to shield the perpetrators.
C. The Overall Climate of Impunity and the BroaderDeficiencies in
the Mexican Criminal Justice System
The impunity concerning enforced disappearances is part of a
larger, overall climate of impunity in Mexico. Enforced disappearance
is not the only potential crime against humanity that has gone largely
unpunished in Mexico. Between 2005 and 2013 there were only four
convictions for torture, 152 and only two of them were final. 153

148.
149.
150.
note 124,
151.

Al Submission, supranote 132, at 10.
Id.
Supr6ma Corte de Justicia de la Naci6n, expediente varios 912/2010, supra
11 44-46.
UNCED Report, supra note 27, ¶ 25; Al Submission, supranote 132, at 9.

152. INT'L FED'N FOR HUM. RTS., MEXICO: INFORME SOBRE PRESUNTA CoMIsI6N DE
CRIMENES DE LESA HUMANIDAD EN BAJA CALIFORNIA ENTRE 2006 Y 2012 22 (2014),

https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/rapport-mexique-ld2-1-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5C36K5D] (archived Oct. 5, 2016).
153. Id.; see also U.N. HRC, 28th Sess., Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Juan E. Mindez ¶
32, U.N. DOC. A/HRC/28/68/Add.3 (Dec. 29, 2014) [hereinafter HRC REPORT] ("The
Government reported only five convictions for torture between 2005 and 2013, of which
two are final and impose prison terms of 3 and 37 years respectively."); Mixico Falsea
Ante la ONU Sentencias Por Tortura (Mexico Misrepresents to the U.N. Sentences for
Torture), VANGUARDIA (July 7, 2014), http://www.vanguardia.com.mx/
mexicofalseaantelaonusentenciasportortura-2107000.html [https://perma.cc/DTW7RN6K] (archived Oct. 5, 2016). However, the Mexican government has reported that
between 2006 and 2015 there have been fifteen federal convictions of torture. See IACHR
Report, supra note 122, 1 212 & n.293 (comparing the reporting and conviction rates for
cases concerning torture).
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Similarly, there have been almost no convictions of public officials for
such acts.1 54 A failure to adequately prosecute torture has persisted
despite the more than 11,254 complaints of torture and ill-treatment
received during that period. 155
What is more, the practice of "femicide," that is, the murder of
women because they are women, has reached near-epidemic levels in
Mexico. 156 Six women fall victim to this crime every day in the
country. 157 A recent report by the National Citizen Femicide
Observatory concluded that, of the 3,892 femicides identified between
2012 and 2013, only 24 percent were investigated by authorities1 5 8 and
only 1.6 percent resulted in conviction.15 9 Almost half of the victims
died from cruel acts and/or the excessive use of physical force. 160 The
fact that the perpetrators "kill women because they are women, and
because they can," is what sets femicide apart from regular murder;161
"[h]ate is what marks these crimes."' 6 2
Furthermore, Mexico's criminal justice system tends to be marked
by blanket impunity for crimes in general. A recent study by El Centro
for Estudios Sobre Impunidad y Justicia ranked Mexico as the second
highest country on its impunity scale.' 6 3 A 2015 report found that only

154. See AMNESTY INT'L ANNUAL REPORT: MEXICO (2014/2015), https://
www.amnesty.org/en/countries/americas/mexico/report-mexico/ [https://perma.cc/Z3A5F4XV] (archived Oct. 5, 2016) ("Investigations into the crimes were not made public and
no one had been prosecuted at the end of the year.").
155. HRC REPORT, supra note 153, T 32.; see also AMNESTY INT'L, PAPER PROMISES,
DAILY

IMPUNITY:

MEXICO'S

TORTURE

EPIDEMIC

CONTINUES

6-8

(2015),

https://www.amnesty.ch/de/laender/amerikas/mexiko/dok/2015/starker-anstieg-vonfolterklagen-offenbart-wachsende-menschenrechtskrise/15 1013_paper-promises-dailyimpunity-english.pdf [https://perma.cc/BTG6-QDRY] (archived Oct. 5, 2016) (noting the
Mexico's federal attorney general's failure to accurately report the number of torture
complaints filed).
156. See VULLIAMY, supra note 50, at 185 (using "feminicidio, femicide, the mass
slaughter of women . .. to describe the iniquity of a singular and savage phenomenon");
see also Judith Matloff, Six Women Murdered Each Day as Femicide in Mexico Nears a
Pandemic, ALJAZEERA AM. (Jan. 4, 2015), http://america.aljazeera.com/multimedia/
2015/l/mexico-s-pandemicfemicides.html [https://perma.cc/ 62GJ-ULK9] (archived Oct.
5, 2016) ("Femicides are a pandemic in Mexico.").
157. Matloff, supranote 156.
158. OBSERVATORIO CIUDADANO NACIONAL DEL FEMINICIDIO, ESTUDIO DE LA
IMPLEMENTACION DEL TIPO PENAL DE FEMINICIDIO EN MEXICO: CAUSAS Y
CONSEQEUNCIAS 2012 Y 2013 199 (2014), http://catolicasmexico.org/ns/wp-content/
uploads/2014/11/Estudio-de-Feminicidio-en-MC3%A9xico-2012-1013.pdf [https://

perma.cc/A9HA-CTFQ] (archived Oct. 5, 2016) [hereinafter ESTUDIO DEL FEMINICIDIO].
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id.
VULLIAMY, supra note 50, at 178.
Matloff, supra note 156.
CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS SOBRE IMPUNIDAD Y JUSTICIA, INDICE GLOBAL DE

IMPUNIDAD 2015 44 (Apr. 2015), http://www.udlap.mx/cesij/resultadosigi20l5.aspx
[https://perma.cc/4AYZ-MFKS] (archived Oct. 26, 2016) [hereinafter INDICE GLOBAL DE
IMPUNIDAD 2015].
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10 percent of all crimes in Mexico are reported. 164 Of the reported
crimes, roughly 65 percent led to the beginning of an investigation. 165
In other words, approximately 7 percent of all crimes, reported and
unreported, led to an investigation. 166 Of the crimes that were
investigated, more than 50 percent resulted in nothing or no resolution,
and roughly 8 percent reached a disposition before a judge.16 7 These
figures suggest that the vast majority of crimes are left unaddressed
(see Figure 1). Despite the fact that 90 percent of cases are prosecuted
at the state level, fewer than 13 percent of cases are resolved at the
state level.168
Figure 1. The Life Cycle of Crimes in Mexico 1 69

-All

Crimes
Known Crimes
Victimization surveys: Less than
25 of 100 crimes are reported (25%)

\

'.*

Criminal Investigations
4.6 out of25 reported crimes are
investigated (18%)
- Crimes Prosecuted
1.6 out of4.6 investigated crimes (35%)

.

Crimes Brought to Trial
12 out of 7.6 investigated crimes (7596)
Crimes Sentenced
1.1 of 1.2 crimes brought to trial (91%)

Despite the reforms described in Section III(A), Mexico's criminal
justice system has continued to be marked by an overall climate of
impunity for the reasons discussed in Section III(C). First and
foremost, there is a demonstrated proclivity for corruption among law

164. See INSTITUTO NAcIONAL DE ESTRADISTICA Y GEOGRAFiA, ENCUESTRA
NACIONAL DE VICTIMIZACION Y PERCEPcI6N SOBRE SEGURIDAD PTJBLICA (Oct. 2015)
[hereinafter ENCUESTRA DE VICTIMIZAcION Y PERCEPCION] (noting that in 2014 10.7
percent of crimes in Mexico were reported).

165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 11 (noting that 53.8 percent of alleged crimes resulted in nothing or
no resolution, while 7.3 percent of alleged crimes reached a disposition before a judge).

168. SEELKE, supra note 111, at 2-3.
169. Id. at 3. This graphic is presented to give an idea of how few crimes reach the
sentencing stage in Mexico. It depicts data from before the 2008 reform, though roughly
the same proportion of cases reach sentencing now.
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enforcement and public prosecutors. The use of bribery and torture by
state and federal investigative police is well documented. 170 Thus,
many of the crimes of concern are committed by state authorities
themselves or by entities that the state wishes to protect. Likewise,
there is pervasive complicity between prosecutors and public
defenders, further suggesting that many public officials are not
interested in pursuing justice. 7 1
Second, even in the absence of such corruption, Mexico would not
have sufficient infrastructure or resources to adequately prosecute all
crimes. Due to case backlogs and inefficiencies, nearly half of Mexico's
current prison population consists of prisoners waiting for a final
verdict. 172 As a result, many of the accused remain in prison for
months or years without a sentence and are detained even when
charged with relatively minor offenses.17 3 As of June 2014, Mexican
prisons were operating 27 percent above capacity. 74 Relatedly, Mexico
generally suffers from inadequate resources and staffing. 175 For
example, Mexico currently has a proportion of four judges for every one
hundred inhabitants, far below the average global proportion of
seventeen judges for every one hundred inhabitants.1 7 6 As a result of
the overwhelming caseloads, judges often delegate matters to
courtroom clerks, and, consequently, many inmates never get to appear
before the judge that sentences them. 7 7
Finally, at the legal level, Mexico suffers from a lack of uniformity
in many of its substantive criminal laws. As with the crime of enforced
disappearance, states have been reluctant to include the crime of
femicide in their criminal codes. Only ten states have included it in
their
criminal
codes,
despite
a federal
law
obligating
implementation.1 7 8 Likewise, the federal definition of torture and the
majority of state definitions of torture do not meet the standards of
international instruments. 179 For example, the newly enacted
National Code of Criminal Procedure continues to authorize the

170. See, e.g., Elena Azaola & Marcelo Bergman, The Mexican Prison System, in
REFORMING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN MEXICO 91, 91-116 (Cornelius Wasda
& David A. Shirk eds., 2007).
171. See generally 2016 HRW Report, supra note 6 (discussing the government's
limited progress in investigating and prosecuting crime).
172. INDICE GLOBAL DE IMPUNIDAD 2015, supra note 163, at 64; see also Shirk, supra
note 104, at 196 ("Because of lengthy delays in criminal proceedings, many defendants
languish in jail for months or years without a sentence.").
173. Shirk, supra note 104, at 196, 210.
174. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 144, at 6.
175. 2016 HRW Report, supra note 6.
176. INDICE GLOBAL DE IMPUNIDAD 2015, supra note 163, at 64.
177. Shirk, supranote 104, at 196.
178.

ESTUDIO DEL FEMINICIDIO, supra note 158, at 201.

179. HRC Report, supra note 153,

11

14-15.
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detention of persons without judicial authorization in urgent cases
1 80
involving serious offenses.
Thus, Mexico is not only plagued by a failure to prosecute enforced
disappearances, it is also plagued by an overall climate of impunity.
And the investigative and prosecutorial efforts concerning other
international crimes suffer from shortcomings similar to the efforts
concerning enforced disappearances.
D. The Resulting Lack of Confidence in the Domestic CriminalJustice
System
Mexico's pervasive impunity and the largely unaddressed
weaknesses in its criminal justice system have resulted in a growing
distrust of criminal justice institutions. In late 2012, 74 percent of the
Mexican public indicated that they have little to no faith in the
181
A 2014 study by the Instituto
domestic criminal justice system.
Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia (INEGI) found that more than 88
percent of the population believes that corrupt practices occur "very
frequently" or "frequently." 182 Nearly 90 percent of the Mexican
population believes its police officers are frequently engaged in
corruption, roughly 85 percent believes that its political parties are
engaged in such practices, and approximately 65 percent believes that
its judges are as well (see Figure 2). 183 Roughly 85 percent of
Mexicans do not trust current President Pefia Nieto, and over 60
percent believe that corruption has increased during his term of
office. 184 Such perceptions of corruption are even shared by law
enforcement officials themselves. One poll of the municipal police in
the city of Guadalajara found that about half of the 5,400 officers
surveyed accept the existence of high levels of corruption in the police
force for which they work, 185 and 68 percent believed that such
186
corruption was concentrated within their own department.

180. Id. ¶ 18.
181. SEELKE, supra note 111, at 11.
182. INEGI, BOLETIN DE PRENSA NiM. 264/14, RESULTADOS DE LA SEGUNDA
ENCUESTA NACIONAL DE CALIDAD E IMPACTO GUBERNAMENTAL 2013 43 (June 16, 2014),

http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/proyectos/encuestas/hogares/especiales/encig/20
2
13/?_file=/est/contenidos/proyectos/encuestasfhogares/especiales/encig/2013/doc/encig O
ENCUESTA
14_06.pdf [https://perma.cc/D82Q-2BPX] (archived Oct. 19, 2016) [hereinafter
NACIONAL DE CALIDAD E IMPACTO GUBERNAMENTAL].

183. Id. at 44.
184. 60% of Mexicans Say Corruption Has Increased with Peila Nieto, TELESUR,
(Feb. 21, 2015), http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/60-of-Mexicans-Say-Corruptionhas-Increased-with-Pena-Nieto---20150221-0005.html [https://perma.cc/4BJN-QKDH]
(archived Oct. 8, 2016).
185. MARCOS PABLO MOLOEZNIK ET AL., JUSTICIABAR6METRO: ENCUESTRA A
OPERADORES DEL SISTEMA DE JUSTICIA PENAL 15 (2009), http://catcher.sandiego.edul

items/peacestudies/justiciabarometro.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CRY-9DJR] (archived Oct.
19, 2016).
186. Id.
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Figure 2. Perceptions of the Frequency of Corruption in
Different Sectors1 87
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The above distrust in Mexican institutions has coincided with the
public's disengagement from the Mexican criminal justice system. Only
10 percent of crimes in Mexico are reported.1 88 More than 80 percent
of crime victims believe that it is a "waste of time" to report a crime to
authorities. 189 Communities in some Mexican states where law
enforcement and judicial institutions are particularly weak have begun
to form armed "self-defense" groups.190 The fact that the delegation of
the survivors and parents of the forty-three missing students called
upon independent, non-state entities to assist in the investigatory
efforts in Iguala confirms that the Mexican public does not trust state
institutions to conduct proper investigations, particularly those who
are victims of crimes. 191 Many relatives of victims of enforced
disappearance suffer from threats or reprisals for becoming involved in
investigations. 192 Thus, it makes sense that so few disappearances are

187. ENCUESTA NACIONAL DE CALIDAD E IMPACTO GUBERNAMENTAL, supra note
182, at 44.
188. ENCUESTRA DE VICTIMIZACION Y PERCEPClIN, supra note 164, at 10.
189. Jo TUCKMAN, MEXICO: DEMOCRACY INTERRUPTED 108 (2012).
190. IACHR Report, supra note 122, 11 47-52; SEELKE, supra note 111, at 4.

191. See Press Release, IACHR, Interdisciplinary Group of Experts to Launch at
IACHR Headquarters its Work on the Case of the Students of Ayotzinapa, Mexico (Jan.

30, 2015) (https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mediacenter/PReleases/2015/008.asp [https://
perma.cc/6DQZ-L28H] (archived Oct. 8, 2016)) (detailing the entities comprising the
interdisciplinary group); The Missing Forty-Three, supra note 5 (reporting on the crisis
in Iguala); The Missing Joy of Mother's Day, PEACE BRIGADES INT'L (May 8, 2015),
http://www.peacebrigades.org/en/content/missing-joy-mothers-day

[https:/perma.cc/9NHC-HUEK] (archived Oct. 19, 2016).
192. UNWGEID Report, supra note 96, T 33.
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reported, as many are discouraged from pursuing investigations due to
interference or the belief that nothing will come of it.
These developments evidence a vicious cycle. As impunity
becomes more rampant, the Mexican public loses confidence in its
domestic criminal justice system and becomes less willing to
participate in that system. Such disengagement further contributes to
impunity, as less crime is reported and investigated. In order to break
this cycle, Mexico will need to enact the reforms necessary to
counteract this epidemic and incentivize state authorities to pursue
justice. Added pressure from international institutions can only aid the
legal reform process. As will be discussed in the remainder of this
Article, pursuing an investigation at the ICC for the crimes of enforced
disappearance is one way to exert such pressure.

IV.

THE THREAT

IS REAL: THE HIGH LIKELIHOOD

OF THE

OTP

OPENING

AN ICC INVESTIGATION

A trial before the ICC concerning enforced disappearances in
Mexico would certainly address some of the impunity plaguing the
country. However, even if there were no trial, the mere threat of an
ICC investigation would in itself exert pressure on domestic
authorities to enact appropriate reform and to think twice about
shielding perpetrators. Furthermore, if a formal investigation were
initiated, it would help clarify the truth concerning many of the most
serious cases of enforced disappearance in the country. Despite the
multitude of other crimes that could form the subject of an ICC
investigation, including murder, torture, severe deprivation of physical
liberty, and persecution against an identifiable group,19 3 this Part will
argue that, even with just the crime of enforced disappearance in
Mexico, the procedural requirements for initiating an investigation
would be met.
Before an ICC investigation can begin, the OTP must conduct a
preliminary examination in order to determine whether to open an
investigation.1 94 Mexico ratified the Rome Statute in 2005, becoming
subject to the ICC's jurisdiction on January 1, 2006, when the treaty
entered into force for Mexico.1 9 5 Consequently, there are three ways to

193. See Rome Statute, supranote 38, art. 7(1) (defining "crime against humanity").
194. Rome Statute, supra note 38, arts. 13-15, 53(1); ICC, Preliminary
Examinations, https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/preliminary-examinations.aspx (last
visited Feb. 3, 2017) [https://perma.cclYV7P-W5HN] (archived Oct. 8, 2016).
195.

See ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

LAW AND PROCEDURE 166-68 (3d. ed. 2014); Press Release, ICC, Mexico Ratifies the
ICC Press Release ICC-CPI-20051031-113 (Oct. 31, 2005)
Rome Statute,
(http://www.icc-cpi.int/en-menus/asp/press%20releases/press%20releases%202005/Pag
es/mexico%20ratifies%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx [https://perma.cc/7XBR-75J5]
(archived Oct. 8, 2016)) [hereinafter Mexico Ratifies the Rome Statute]; Rome Statute,
supra note 38, arts. 12-15.
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initiate
a
preliminary
examination
concerning
enforced
disappearances in Mexico: the Mexican government refers the
situation to the ICC Prosecutor (the Prosecutor), the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) refers the situation to the Prosecutor, or the
Prosecutor initiates an investigation propio motu.1 96
The first scenario is unlikely. As state involvement is inherently
part of the enforced disappearance definition, it is unlikely that the
Mexican government would be willing to risk any exposure of
government participation in international crimes. Likewise, as
mentioned above, the Mexican government has historically resisted the
involvement of the ICC. The second scenario is also unlikely. There is
currently nothing to suggest that the UNSC would refer a situation in
Mexico in the near future. As previously mentioned, in February 2015
the UNCED released a report on Mexico, but with little effect. And
recent pleas for UNSC referrals have largely focused on atrocities
occurring in other parts of the world. 19 7
Thus, if a preliminary examination concerning enforced
disappearances in Mexico were to begin, most likely the Prosecutor
would have to initiate it. 198 Subject to the Pre-Trial Chamber's
approval, 199 the Prosecutor may initiate preliminary examination
propio motu on the basis of information concerning crimes within the
jurisdiction of the court sent in by individuals or groups, states, or nongovernmental organizations. 200 The OTP has already received
numerous pleas to initiate a preliminary examination following the

196. See Rome Statute, supra note 38, arts. 13-15 (discussing the processes by
which the ICC will begin a preliminary investigation). For a comprehensive review of
how a preliminary examination could be opened in other scenarios, see CRYER ET AL.,
supra note 195, at 166-68.
197. See, e.g., Michelle Nichols, FrancePresses U.N. for Islamic State to Face Court,
REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/27/mideast-crisisislamic-state-un-idUSL2NOWT1QY20150327 [https://perma.cc/BE58-YX6D] (archived
Oct. 8, 2016) (describing France's efforts to urge the UNSC to refer the Islamic State
militant group to the ICC); Press Release, UNSC, Referral of Syria to International
Criminal Court Fails as Negative Votes Prevent Security Council from Adopting Draft
Resolution, U.N. Press Release SC/11407 (May 22, 2014), http://www.un.org/press/en
/2014/sc11407.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/8VFC-59DT] (archived Oct. 8, 2016) (describing
the UNSC's unwillingness to refer the situation in Syria to the ICC).
198. See Rome Statute, supra note 38, art. 15(3) (detailing the process through
which the Prosecutor requests authorization for an investigation); see also Prosecutor v.
Katanga & Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 8, AC Judgment, IT 73-79 (Sept. 25, 2009)
[hereinafter Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chuil (discussing the analysis by which the ICC
determines when it has jurisdiction over a case based on the insufficiency of domestic
prosecutorial efforts).
199. Situation in the Republic of C6te D'Ivoire, ICC-02/11, PTC Decision Pursuant
to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the
Situation in the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire, I]T 16-18 (Oct. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Situation
in the Republic of C~te D'Ivoire]; Rome Statute, supra note 38, art. 15(3), 15(4).
200. OTP, ICC, Report on PreliminaryExamination Activities 2015 ¶ 12 (Nov. 12,
2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otpIOTP-PE-rep-2015-Eng.pdf. [https://perma.cc/
GJG8-3PU2] (archived Oct. 8, 2016) [hereinafter OTP Report]; Rome Statute, supra note
38, art. 15(1).
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events in Iguala, 20 but, at the time of writing, the OTP has not yet

responded.
Assuming the OTP opened a preliminary examination in this way,
the OTP could then consider the requirements for initiating an
investigation. In order to open an investigation, the OTP must be
satisfied that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an
investigation. 202 That determination is based on an examination of the
factors set out under Article 53(1)(a)-(c) of the Rome Statute:
(A)

temporal jurisdiction and either territorial or personal jurisdiction;

(B) material jurisdiction;
(C)

admissibility (gravity and complementarity); and

(D)

the interests of justice.

20 3

This Part will analyze each of these factors in turn, and ultimately
conclude that, if the OTP were to initiate a preliminary examination,
it would indeed decide to initiate an investigation.
Some may oppose the pursuit of an investigation in Mexico,
arguing that the procedural hurdles for opening an investigation,
particularly the complementarity analysis, would not be satisfied, and
that the case would thus waste valuable court resources. In fact, the
Mexican government did just that after a complaint 204 was filed in
2011 requesting an investigation into crimes committed by President
205
Others
Calder6n and the drug lord Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman.
may argue that the relevant elements of the crime of enforced
disappearance would not be satisfied. Carola Zandbergen is one of the

201. See, e.g., European Parliament Resolution on the Abduction of 43 Students in
Guerrero/Mexico (2014/2905(RSP)) 1 9 (2014) (calling on the OTP to open an
investigation of the enforced disappearances in Mexico); INTE.FED'N OF HUMAN RIGHTS
ET AL., COMUNICACION DE ACUERDO CON EL ARTiCULO 15 DEL ESTATUTO DE ROMA DE LA
CORTE PENAL INTERNACIONAL SOBRE LA PRESUNTA COMISION DE CRIMENES DE LESA

2014),
(Sept.
1-23
Y
2012
2006
ENTRE
EN Mtxico
HUMANIDAD,
https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/informe-mexicocpi.pdf [https://perma.cc/95ZJ-PYB9]
(archived Oct. 8, 2016) (calling on the ICC Prosecutor to open a preliminary examination
into alleged Crimes Against Humanity in Mexico); Statement of the Mexican
Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights to the 13th session of the
(http://cmdpdh.org/wp2014)
10,
(Dec.
Parties
States
of
Assembly
content/uploads/2014/12/JntENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/APF8-QC2Q] (archived Nov. 22,
2016) [hereinafter CMDPH Letter] (urging the president of the Bureau of the Assembly
States Parties to urge the prosecutor to initiate a Preliminary Examination).
202. Rome Statute, supra note 38, art. 15(3); see also ICC, Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1, at 17 (2000).
203. Rome Statute, supra note 38, art. 53(1)(a)-(c); OTP Report, supranote 200, 1 3.
204. Mexico Activists Seek ICC Investigation of Drugs War, BBC (Nov. 25, 2011),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-15899687 [https://perma.cclYZ7T-XV6Q]
(archived Oct. 8, 2016).
205. Id.
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few who has analyzed these requirements. She argues that a number
of the chapeau requirements for crimes against humanity would likely
not be satisfied in the context of the Mexican drug war.2 06 This Part
will respond to these claims.
A. Temporal, Territorial,and PersonalJurisdiction
In order to open an ICC investigation, the OTP must conclude that
there is (i) temporal jurisdiction and (ii) either territorial or personal
jurisdiction. 207 This Section analyzes this requirement and concludes
that it would indeed be met.
The Rome Statute entered into force for Mexico when it became a
State Party, on January 1, 2006.208 Thus, the ICC would have temporal
jurisdiction over Rome Statute crimes committed in the territory of
Mexico or by its nationals from January 1, 2006 onwards. 209 If the OTP
were to examine the enforced disappearances as occurring in the
context of the Mexican drug war, nearly all of such crimes would fall
within the desired period, as the war began around 2006.
For there to be territorial jurisdiction, the acts in question must
have been committed on the territory of a State Party. 210 For personal
jurisdiction, the acts in question must have been committed by a
national of a State Party. 211 In light of the information discussed in
earlier Sections, both bases for jurisdiction would be satisfied in this
case, as the enforced disappearances occurred within Mexico and were
likely committed by Mexican nationals (e.g., state authorities or
Mexican drug cartel members). 212 Thus, the first two bases for
jurisdiction would be satisfied.
B. MaterialJurisdiction
In order to initiate an ICC investigation, the requirement of
material jurisdiction must also be satisfied. 213 For there to be material

206. Zandbergen, supra note 37, at 30-33, 35-40.
207. Rome Statute, supra note 38, arts. 11-13; OTP Report, supra note 200, 1 4.
208. See Mexico Ratifies the Rome Statute, supranote 195 (establishing the date on
which Mexico ratified the Rome Statute).
209. Rome Statute, supra note 38, art. 11(2); OTP Report, supra note 200, 1 112
(reaching a similar conclusion as to the jurisdiction in Afghanistan); see also Situation
in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09, PTC Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome
Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of
Kenya, IT 173-74 (Mar. 31, 2010) [hereinafter Situation in the Republic of Kenya]
(reaching a similar conclusion).
210. Rome Statute, supra note 38, art. 12(2); OTP Report, supranote 200, 1 4.
211. Id.
212. See Situation in the Republic of Kenya, supra note 209, ¶¶ 175-80 (similarly
finding jurisdiction ratione loci as there was sufficient information to believe that the
acts in question occurred on Kenyan territory).
213. Rome Statute, supranote 38, arts. 11-13; OTP Report, supra note 200, 1 4.
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jurisdiction, the Prosecutor must be satisfied that a crime within the
jurisdiction of the court has been or is being committed. Enforced
disappearance is a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute,
and thus it is a crime within the jurisdiction of the court. 214 However,
for material jurisdiction, the information available must also provide
the Prosecutor with "a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within
215
This
the jurisdiction of the court has been or is being committed."
216
and
test is the lowest evidentiary standard provided by the statute,
to the Prosecutor need not be
the information available
''comprehensive" or "conclusive," as required in the investigation
phase. 217

This Section will examine the likelihood of the OTP finding a
reasonable basis to believe that the crime of enforced disappearance
has been committed in Mexico. In order to qualify as an enforced
disappearance under the Rome Statute, the act in question must first
satisfy the chapeau requirements for crimes against humanity under
Article 7(1) and then meet the definition of enforced disappearance
under Article 7(2)(i). This Section will ultimately conclude that both
sets of requirements would be satisfied.
1. The Chapeau Requirements for Crimes against Humanity
In order to qualify as a crime against humanity under the Rome
Statute, the act in question must be committed as part of an "attack"
that is
(1)

directed against a civilian population,

(2)

widespread or systematic, and

(3)

committed pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or organizational
policy.218

Article 7(2)(a) defines an attack as "any course of conduct
involving the multiple commission of acts" referred to in Article 7(1).219
Thus, a single act of intentional killing could constitute a crime against
humanity, if that act fits within the context of a widespread or
systematic attack. 220 According to the ICC Elements of the Crimes, a

214. Rome Statute, supra note 38, arts. 5, 7(1), 13.
215. Id. art. 53(1)(a).
216. Situation in the Republic of C6te D'Jvoire, supra note 199, 1 24.
217. Id.
218. Rome Statute, supra note 38, at arts. 7(1), 7(2)(a).
219. Id. at art. 7(2)(a).
220. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶ 649 (ICTY
May 7, 1997).
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military attack is not necessary. 221 The instances of mass
disappearance, like Iguala and the 2010 San Fernando Massacre, all
occurred during the Mexican drug war, which involved countless acts
of crimes listed under Article 7(1), including murder, severe
deprivation of liberty, torture, and enforced disappearance. 222 Such a
context would very likely constitute the kind of attack referenced in
the statute, even if just the instances of enforced disappearance were
considered.
a. An Attack Directed against the Civilian Population
The first element requires that the attack be directed against the
civilian population. The term civilian population encompasses "groups
distinguishable by nationality, ethnicity, or other distinguishable
features." 223 It refers to persons who are civilians, rather than
members of the armed forces and other legitimate combatants. 224 In
particular, where there is no established armed conflict under
international humanitarian law, 225 the term includes "all persons
except those who have the duty to maintain public order and have the
legitimate means to exercise force." 226 The entire civilian population
need not be targeted, though the targeted group of persons must have
been the primary object of the attack; a group of incidental victims
would be insufficient. 227
This element would be satisfied. Many of the victims of the mass
disappearances identified earlier all share distinguishable features. In
the case of Iguala, the victims were all students of the Ayotzinapa
school. 22 8 In the 2010 San Fernando Massacre, the victims were all
foreign migrants. 22 9 The victims of femicide who remained missing for
230
prolonged periods of time were all female.

221. Preparatory Comm'n for the ICC, Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1), U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000).
222. Rome Statute, supra note 38, at arts. 7(1)(a), (e), (0, & (i).
223. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., Case No. ICC-01/-9-01/11, PTC Decision on
the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 1
164 (Jan. 23, 2012) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Ruto et al.] (indicating that the civilian
population can include a group defined by its (perceived) political affiliation); see also G.
METTRAUX, INTERNATIONAL

CRIMES & THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS

166 (2005)

("The

'population' must form a somewhat self-contained group of individuals, either
geographically or as a result of other common features.").
224. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, supra note 209, ¶ 82.
225. Recall that whether the "war" in Mexico would qualify as an armed conflict
under international humanitarian law is still debated. See, e.g., Nill SAnchez, supra note
7, at 470-91.
226. Prosecutor v. Kayieshma & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1, TC Judgment, ¶
127 (May 21, 1999) (emphasis in original).
227. Situation in the Republic of C~te D'Ivoire, supra note 199, ¶ 33.
228. The Missing Forty-Three, supranote 5.
229. Turati, supranote 73, at 15.
230. Matloff, supranote 156.
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Zandbergen argues that most crimes during the Mexican drug war
have targeted members of drug cartels, and thus civilians are not the
main targets. 231 However, this argument assumes that members of
drug cartels are not civilians. Even in cases where the intended targets
are presumed members of rival gangs, in the absence of an armed
conflict, such victims would still form part of an identifiable group,
namely a cartel. Furthermore, an attack against drug cartel members
would qualify as an attack against the civilian population, as most drug
cartel members would likely not have a duty to maintain public order
or the legitimate means to exercise force. In contrast, crimes directed
against members of the Mexican law enforcement or national armed
services would not form part of an attack on civilian population, as such
individuals would have had that duty and legitimate means to use
force.
All in all, the OTP would likely conclude that many of the enforced
disappearances committed in the context of the drug war were directed
against the civilian population.
b. A Widespread or Systematic Attack
The second element requires that the attack also be either
widespread or systematic. Widespread refers both to the number of
resultant victims and the large-scale nature of the attack. 232 The
analysis is not exclusively quantitative or geographical, but rather
based on the facts of the case.23 3 The attack may be the "cumulative
effect of a series of inhumane acts or singular effect of an inhumane act
of extraordinary magnitude." 234 The ICC has not set an express
minimum number of victims. In Prosecutor v. Ruto, the Pre-Trial
Chamber found that an attack was widespread given that it covered
four locations in two districts and involved the death of more than 230
people. 235 The OTP similarly opined, for the purposes of the
preliminary examination, that the murder or disappearance of 156

231. Zandbergen, supra note 37, at 33-34.
232. See, e.g., Situation in the Republic of Kenya, supra note 209, ¶ 95 ("As such,
the element refers to both the large-scale nature of the attack and the number of
resultant victims."); see also Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08,
PTC Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of
the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 1 83 (June 15, 2009) (indicating that
in order to be widespread the attack must be "carried out over a large geographical area
or .. . in a small geographical area directed against a large number of civilians").
233. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, supra note 209, at 1 95.
234. Id.
235. See Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., supranote 223, ¶f 175-78 ("Viewed as a whole,
the evidence shows that the attack was massive, frequent, carried out collectively with
considerable seriousness and directed against a large number of civilian victims.").
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persons and the rape of or sexual violence towards 109 women were
sufficient to establish a widespread attack. 236
Even just looking at the instances of mass disappearance in
Mexico, it is likely that this element could be satisfied. The UNCED
has concluded that there was "a context of generalized disappearances
in a large part of the territory of the state, many of which could qualify
as enforced disappearance." 237 The events in Iguala involved the
disappearance of forty-three students in the state of Guerrero. 238 The
2010 San Fernando Massacre involved the disappearance of seventytwo migrants in the state of Tamaulipas.2 3 9 The nearly three hundred
disappearances perpetrated at the hands of the "Stew Maker" likely
occurred in Baja California. 240 Those instances are in addition to the
250 documented enforced disappearances identified by HRW that are
occurring all over Mexico. 24 1 The discovery of countless mass graves all
over Mexico further suggests that Iguala and the 2010 San Fernando
Massacres are not the first instances of their kind. 242 Both the
cumulative number of victims and the geographic range support a
finding of the widespread character.
In the alternative, the systematic character could also likely be
demonstrated. The term systematic is qualitative in nature. 243 It refers
to the "organized nature of the acts of violence and the improbability
of their random occurrence." 244 It can "often be expressed through
patterns of crimes, in the sense of non-accidental repetition of similar
criminal conduct on a regular basis." 245 Contrary to the findings of
Zandbergen, 246 there does seem to be evidence of that pattern of
criminality. The Stew Maker's process of dissolving three hundred
victims underground certainly indicates a "non-accidental repetition"
of the same crime on a regular basis.

247

Similarly, the discovery of at

least seventeen other mass graves in the area surrounding Iguala
during the search for the forty-three students strongly supports the

236. See OTP Report, supra note 200, 11 171-73 (discussing the events that took
place on September 28, 2009 at Conakry stadium for the purposes of the preliminary
examination in Guinea).
237. UNCED Report, supra note 27, ¶ 10.
238. The Missing Forty-Three, supranote 5.
239. See Turati, supra note 73, at 16-17.
240. Stew Maker Article, supra note 82 ('Stew maker' . . . confessed to disposing
of at least 300 bodies over a decade by dumping them in graves and pouring acid on them
to let them dissolve underground.").
241. MEXICO'S DISAPPEARED, supra note 100, at 1.

242. See, e.g., BORDERLAND BEAT Article, supra note 84 (describing the discovery of
more than 500 persons in mass graves in the northern part of the state of Coahuila
alone).
243. GERHARD WERLE & FLORIAN JESSBERGER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL LAW 340 (3d ed. 2014).
244. Situation in the Republic of C6te D'Ivoire, supra note 199,
245. Id.
246. Zandbergen, supra note 37, at 30-32.
247. See Stew Maker Article, supra note 82.

¶

54.
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inference that many enforced disappearances end with the execution
and burial of the victims. 248 Such techniques for making someone
disappear cannot be committed accidently. On the contrary, they
require a coordinated effort in order to avoid their discovery.
Based on this evidence, the OTP would likely conclude that there
was a widespread and systematic attack in Mexico.
c. An Attack Committed Pursuant to or in Furtherance of a State or
Organizational Policy
The final element requires that the attack also be conducted
249
pursuant to or in furtherance of a "State or organizational policy."
The term policy is interpreted broadly as encompassing a planned,
directed, or organized crime25 0 that evidences a regular pattern. 25 1 The
crucial factor is that the actual aim of the policy be to attack a civilian
population. 252 The previously mentioned context of the Mexican drug
war supports the existence of such a policy, as countless enforced
disappearances, not to mention murders, torture, and persecution, are
being committed as part of a preconceived strategy to eliminate
perceived enemies, many of whom form a part of the civilian
population.
The body responsible for such a policy must be either a state or an
organization.2 53 The term state includes regional and local government
entities; a policy need not have been harbored by the "highest level of
the State machinery," to qualify as a state policy. 254 As previously
discussed, the precise level of state involvement in enforced
disappearances in Mexico remains unclear. However, the events in
Iguala and the 2010 San Fernando Massacre both evidence a pattern
of at least some involvement by state officials in the perpetration of
such acts. 2 55 HRW identified a similar pattern in its 2013 Report,
wherein it concluded that state agents were directly or indirectly
involved in more than half of the organization's documented enforced

248. See Another 17 Mass Graves Found in Iguala, Mexico, TELESUR (Dec. 20,
2014), http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Another-17-Mass-Graves-Found-in-Iguala
-Mexico-20141220-0026.html [https://perma.cc/4HGG-E5P4] (archived Oct. 19, 2016)
("Blanco added that on December 18, UPOEG, together with the family members of the
43 missing Ayotzinapa teachers college students and the Federal Prosecutor's Search
Unit found the graves in the Barranca del Tigre area of Iguala district.").
249. Rome Statute, supranote 38, at art. 7(2)(a).
250. See Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., supra note 223, ¶ 210 ("[A]n attack which is
'planned, directed or organised', as opposed to 'spontaneous or [consisting of] isolated
acts,' satisfies the policy requirement.").
251. Situation in the Republic of C6te D'Ivoire, supra note 199, 1 43.
252. See Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., supra note 223, ¶ 210-11, 213 ("[T]he
organisational policy must be directed to commit 'such attack."').
253. Rome Statute, supra note 38, at art. 7(2)(a).
254. Situation in the Republic of C6te D'Ivoire, supra note 199, 1 45.
255. Devereaux, supra note 2, pt. 2; Turati, supra note 73, at 16-17.
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disappearances. 256 This well-documented pattern supports the
inference that officials at various levels of the Mexican government do
harbor policies to at least facilitate enforced disappearances against
the civilian population.
Zandbergen concludes that President Calder6n's initiation of the
War on Drugs in 2006 does not amount to the requisite state policy, as
its purpose was meant to reduce drug-related violence, and thus there
was no state policy within the meaning of the Rome Statute in that
context.2 57 However, it is worth reiterating that the policy need not be
made explicit or be decided upon at the highest levels.258 In line with
the jurisprudence of the Pre-Trial Chamber, the aforementioned
pattern of state collusion evidences a common policy among at least
some Mexican officials. 259
Regardless, the existence of an organizational policy would likely
be found. The precise meaning and scope of organization remains
debated. The Pre-Trial Chamber has interpreted the term fairly
broadly to include non-state actors, emphasizing the group's potential,
in terms of physical capacity and personnel, to perform acts that violate
human rights.2 60 For example, in Prosecutorv. Ruto, the following was
sufficient to establish the existence of an organization: (i) the existence
of a leader, three commanders, and four divisional commanders, (ii)
access to a considerable amount of capital, guns, and manpower, and
(iii) the creation of an entity that had the primary purpose of attacking
supporters of political opponents. 261
However, in a dissenting opinion, Judge Hans-Peter Kaul
advocated for a more limited interpretation of organization, excluding
most non-state actors. 262 According to Judge Kaul, in order to qualify
as an organization, such an entity must act like a state. 263 Accordingly,
the entity must have the following characteristics: (i) a collectivity of
persons, (ii) established and acting for a common purpose, (iii)
operating over a prolonged period of time, (iv) a hierarchical structure,
"including, as a minimum, some kind of policy level," (v) a capacity to
impose that policy on its members and sanction appropriately, and (vi)
a capacity and means to attack a civilian population on a large scale. 264

Many of the major drug cartels committing enforced
disappearance in Mexico could satisfy the conditions for an

256. MExico's DISAPPEARED, supra note 100, at 1, 29-33.

257. Zandbergen, supra note 37, at 32-33.
258. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, supra note 209, I 87, 89.
259. Situation in the Republic of C6te D'Ivoire, supra note 199, at 1 43 (clarifying
the criteria for a state policy).
260. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, supra note 209, 1 90.
261. Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., supranote 223, 11 194-97, at 74-76.
262. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, supra note 209, IT 51-53, at 27-29 (Kaul,
J., dissenting).
263. Id. 1 51, at 27.
264. Id. 1 51, at 27-28.
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organization under either formulation. Most Mexican drug cartels
have the basic structure of command and the weapons, financial
265
resources, and manpower necessary to carry out large-scale attacks.
Indeed, any entity that has the capacity to bring down a military
helicopter, 266 dump forty-nine decapitated bodies on a public
268
could not have
highway, 267 or dissolve three hundred bodies in acid,
done so without this sort of a capacity or organized command structure.
The "generalized" scope of the enforced disappearances is a testament
to that.269
As previously mentioned, drug cartels are fundamentally driven
270
Their billionby profit and the desire to control trafficking routes.
2 71
For these reasons, many drug
dollar enterprises take years to build.
cartels have acquired or assembled paramilitary units for the purpose
of intimidating and eliminating perceived enemies, including
civilians. 272 With such forces, drug cartels not only have the capacity
to attack the civilian population, but also the capacity to sanction any
dissident members of the cartel who do not acquiesce to the cartel's
plans.
The rationale behind Judge Kaul's dissent is that the
juxtaposition between state and organizationin Article 7(2)(a) implies
that organizations "should partake of some characteristics of a
State." 273 However, in many smaller cities in Mexico, most notably
Michoacin, many drug cartels do operate like a state: they establish
parallel governments and fulfill many government functions, like
ensuring public safety.274 Although Judge Kaul regards the existence

265. See Callin Kerr, Mexico's Drug War: Is It Really a War?, 54 S. TEX. L. REV. 193,
200-06 (2012); Carina Bergal, Note, The Mexican Drug War: The Case for a NonInternationalArmed Conflict Classification, 34 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1042, 1086 (2011);
Craig A. Bloom, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Mexico, Drugs, and InternationalLaw,
34 Hous. J. INT'L L. 345, 385-93 (2012); Patrick Radden Keefe, Cocaine Incorporated,
N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/magazine/how-amexican-drug-cartel-makes-its-billions.html?pagewanted=all&_r=O [https://perma.cc/
G6RR-SXB5] (archived Oct. 8, 2016).
266. Tuckman, supra note 68.
267. 49 MutilatedBodies, supra note 65.
268. Stew Maker Article, supra note 82.
269. UNCED Report, supra note 27, 1 10.
270. Nill SAnchez, supra note 7, at 503.
271.

See MALCOLM BEITH, THE LAST NARCO: HUNTING EL CHAPO, THE WORLD'S

MOST WANTED DRUG LORD 56-196 (2010); Keefe, supra note 265.
272. See, e.g., Noah Rayman, Mexico's Feared Narcos: A Brief History of the Zetas
Drug Cartel, TIME (July 16, 2013), http://world.time.com/2013/07/16/mexicos-fearednarcos-a-brief-history-of-the-zetas-drug-cartell [https://perma.cc/49BS-9K27] (archived
Oct. 8, 2016).
273. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, supra note 209, ¶ 51, at 27 (Kaul, J.,
dissenting).
274. Jerjes Aguirre & Hugo Amador Herrera, Institutional Weaknesses and
Organized Crime in Mexico: The Case of Michoacdn, 16 TRENDS ORG. CRIM. 221, 224-34
(2013).
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of such state-like criminal organizations as unlikely, 2 75 such groups

are very much a reality in many parts of Mexico.
Thus, it is likely that the Prosecutor would find the existence of
an attack pursued in furtherance of a state policy, or, at the minimum,
the existence of an attack pursued in furtherance of an organizational
policy. Consequently, all of the chapeau elements for crimes against
humanity would be met.
2. The Definition of Enforced Disappearance
In order to find a reasonable basis to believe that enforced
disappearances have or are being committed, the acts in question must
not only form part of the kind of attack discussed above, but also meet
the definition for enforced disappearance under the Rome Statute.
Under Article 7(2)(i), an enforced disappearance involves
(1)

an arrest, detention, or abduction of persons;

(2)

[carried out] by, or with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of a
State or political organization;

(3)

followed by the refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of liberty or to
give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons;

(4)

with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time.276

The ICC has not yet heard a case involving an alleged enforced
disappearance. Likewise, the OTP has dealt very little with the crime
in its preliminary examination reports, and, when it has, it has not
engaged in a full analysis of the elements of the crime. 277 As a result,

this subsection will look to the jurisprudence of the IACtHR for
guidance where appropriate, as it is a court that has heard at least
thirteen cases involving enforced disappearance in Latin America.2 78

275. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, supra note 209, 1 52, at 28 (Kaul, J.,
dissenting).
276. Rome Statute, supra note 38, art. 7(2)(i).
277. See, e.g., OTPReport, supra note 200, ¶¶ 171-74 (finding a reasonable basis to
believe the crime of enforced disappearance was committed with respect to the situation
in Guinea).
278. See Rodriguez Vera et al. (Desaparecidos del Palacio de Justicia) v. Colombia,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 287 (Nov. 14, 2014); Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico,
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209 (Nov. 23, 2009)
[hereinafter Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico]; Gonzilez et al. ("Cotton Field") v. Mexico,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205 (Nov. 16, 2009); Ticona Estrada et al. v.
Bolivia, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 191 (Nov. 27, 2008); Heliodoro
Portugal v. Panama, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 186 (Aug. 12, 2008)
[hereinafter Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama]; Goiburd et. al. v. Paraguay, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 153 (Sept. 22, 2006); Blade6n-Garcia v. Perd, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 148 (Apr. 6, 2006); Case of the Mapiripin Massacre v.
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This subsection will utilize the example of Iguala to demonstrate that
many of the disappearances in Mexico would meet the definition of
enforced disappearance under the Rome Statute.
a. The Deprivation of Liberty Element
To qualify as enforced disappearance under the statute, there
279
According
must have first been an arrest, detention, or abduction.
to Attorney General Murillo Karam's "historical truth," the forty-three
students were first detained by Iguala municipal police before being
handed over to the Guerreros Unidos, who crammed the students into
the back of two trucks, piled one on top of the other. 280 HRW identified
a similar pattern of state authorities first detaining and then
transferring victims to members of drug cartels.281 For example, the
282
facts of the 2010 San Fernando Massacre evidence a similar pattern.
283
the students
Even if the "historical truth" is false, as many claim,
were nevertheless ultimately abducted within the meaning of the
statute.
The corresponding element in the Inter-American Convention on
Forced Disappearances (IACFDP) is slightly broader. It requires any
284
Thus, the
"deprivation of freedom" against the will of the person.
IACtHR considers whether the victim was arbitrarily detained and
whether such detention complied with procedures enshrined in local
law.28 5 In Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama, taking victims against their
will to an unknown destination without explaining the reasons for

Colombia, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 122 (Sept. 15, 2005); Case of the 19
Merchants, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 93 (June 12, 2002) [hereinafter
Case of the 19 Merchants]; Bimaca-Veldsquez v. Guatemala, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 70 (Nov. 25, 2000) [hereinafter BAmaca-Veldsquez v. Guatemala];
Cantoral-Benavides v. Perl, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 69 (Aug. 18,
2000); Caballero-Delgado & Santana v. Colombia, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 22 (Dec. 8, 1995); VelAsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 4 (July 29, 1988).
279. Rome Statute, supranote 38, art. 7(2)(i).
280. Devereaux, supra note 2, pt. 2, at 7-8; Francisco Goldman, Crisis in Mexico:
The Protests for the Missing Forty-Three, NEW YORKER (Nov. 12, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/crisis-mexico-protests-missing-forty-three
[https://perma.cc/TD5G-54SW] (archived Oct. 8, 2016) [hereinafter Crisis in Mexico].
281. See MEXICO'S DISAPPEARED, supranote 100, at 1, 29-33.
282. See Turati, supra note 73, at 16-18 (explaining that the victims of the 2010
massacre in San Fernando, Tamaulipas, were also detained by police, who later placed
them in the custody of a drug cartel).
283. See, e.g., EAAF Report, supra note 17, ¶ 3 (finding that the forensic evidence
does not support the theory that the incinerated remains discovered belong to the fortythree missing students); GIEI REPORT, supra note 17, at 307-31 (claiming that the fate
of the missing forty-three students is still unclear); Piccato, supra note 13 (concluding
that the Mexican government, not a drug cartel, was responsible for the missing
students' disappearances).
284. Inter-American Convention, supra note 40, art. 2.
285. See, e.g., BAmaca-Veldsquez v. Guatemala, supranote 278, 1 143.
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their captivity was sufficient to satisfy the element. 286 In Iguala, the
forty-three students were piled one on top of the other in the back of a
truck, which strongly indicates that the Guerreros Unidos detained the
students against their will and in violation of local law. 287 Thus, the
detention and subsequent abduction of the students would satisfy both
the Rome Statute and the IACFDP.
b. The Requisite State Authorization, Support, or Acquiescence
Perhaps the most controversial element of enforced disappearance
is the requirement that the detention or abduction be carried out "by[
or with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of a State or a
political organization." 288 This Article does not mean to ascribe blame
to the Mexican government, federal or local, for all the disappearances
plaguing Mexico, but will merely observe that there have been
disappearances perpetrated with the support of state authorities, and
that such instances would meet the definition of state authorization,
support, or acquiescence.
In the cases of Iguala and the 2010 San Fernando Massacre, local
Mexican authorities carried out the initial detention and subsequently
transferred the victims to drug cartels. 289 HRW has documented at
least 149 cases of enforced disappearance occurring in Mexico with
similar patterns of state involvement, at least in the initial detention
of victims.

290

In those circumstances,

there would be sufficient

evidence that state authorities carried out at least the initial detention,
and in doing so they supported the ultimate abduction of the victims
by conducting that detention. In cases like Iguala, where the Mayor of
Iguala, Jos6 Luis Abarca, allegedly ordered the municipal police to
detain the students como sea (by whatever means), arguments could
be made that state authorities not only supported the detention but
also authorized and acquiesced to it. 291 The current lack of information

available makes it difficult to conclude that state authorities conducted
the entire Iguala abduction, though the wording of the statute makes
clear that state authorities need only conduct a detention or support
the abduction.

286. Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama, supra note 278,

1

113.

287. See NIELS UILDRIKS & NELIA TELLO PEON, MEXICO'S UNRULE OF LAW:
IMPLEMENTING
HUMAN RIGHTS
IN POLICE AND JUDICIAL REFORM UNDER

DEMOCRATIZATION 75-77 (2010) (explaining that Mexican law requires that detention be
formally registered and that the detainees immediately be handed over to the public
prosecutor's office).
288. Rome Statute, supra note 38, art. 7(2)(i).
289. See The Missing Forty-Three, supra note 5, at 2; Turati, supra note 73, at 1618.
290. MEXICO'S DISAPPEARED, supra note 100, at 1, 17-33 (finding ninety-five cases
of enforced disappearance involving local police; sixty involving security forces; thirteen
involving the federal police; and twenty involving the Navy).
291. See The Missing Forty-Three, supra note 5 at 2.
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The corresponding element in the Inter-American Convention
largely mirrors that of the Rome Statute, although it specifically
recognizes that non-state actors, "acting with the authorization,
support, or acquiescence of the state," may perpetrate the deprivation
of liberty in question. 292 As a human rights court, the IACtHR
emphasizes omissions by state authorities with respect to preventing
such deprivations. In Case of the 19 Merchants v. Colombia, the court
found it sufficient that the paramilitary group controlled the region,
that members of the Colombian military endorsed a plan to murder the
victims, and that law enforcement officials "let them [gain] advantage
and failed to control and monitor them," despite knowing that the
paramilitary group was committing criminal acts, massacres, and
29 3
collective murders.
The court's analysis seems to be centered on the state's failure to
act despite an awareness of a non-state entity's history of prior human
rights abuses and the state's endorsement of a plan to repeat those
abuses. In the case of Iguala, the local police would have been aware of
the cartel's proclivity for egregious human rights violations in the area,
such as murder and torture, 294 and, in handing over the students to
such gangs, would have had reason to expect that the students would
have at least been detained by an entity lacking a legal basis to do so
295
and in violation of a human right.
Despite the likelihood of finding the requisite state acquiescence
or support in many disappearance cases in Mexico, drug cartels would
not qualify as political organizations within the meaning of the statute.
Some legal scholars have advocated that the phrase is meant to include
entities that are obligated to provide information on the whereabouts
of missing persons. 296 Under this line of argument, it is the state's
participation in the crime that justifies enforced disappearance being
a crime against humanity and that distinguishes the crime from other
crimes like kidnapping and abduction. 297 As Irena Giorgou
convincingly argues, non-state actors are generally not expected to
ensure the legally mandated procedural protections accompanying
deprivations of liberty or to inform the public about the whereabouts

292. Inter-American Convention, supra note 40, art. 2.
293. Case of the 19 Merchants, supra note 278, 1 1 84-86, 118-22, 135.
294. See Iguala and Guerreros Unidos, GUERRERO VIOLENCE PROJECT (Oct. 12,
2014), https://guerreroviolenceproject.wordpress.com/2014/10/12/iguala-and-guerrerosunidos/ [https:/perma.ccV8MG-V5WG] (archived Oct. 8, 2016).
295. See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights
art. 7, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978)
(concerning the right to personal liberty).
296. See, e.g., WERLE & JESSBERGER, supra note 243, at 382; Irena Giorgou, State
Involvement in the Perpetrationof Enforced Disappearanceand the Rome Statute, 11 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1001, 1012 (2013).
297. WERLE & JESSBERGER, supra note 243, at 333; Giorgou, supra note 296, at
1012-13.
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of disappeared persons. 298 Indeed, the drafters would not have
included the term political organization if they meant to refer to all
private entities. The inclusion of the term political as a qualifier was
meant to encompass a narrower spectrum of entities than the
organization referred to in the chapeau requirements. Thus, acts
committed by drug cartel members must have been committed with
some involvement by the state in order to qualify as enforced
disappearances; acts committed solely by drug cartel members would
not meet the requirements of the statute.
c. The Refusal to Provide Information on the Fate and Whereabouts of
the Victim
In order to constitute enforced disappearance under the Rome
Statute, the abduction or detention of the person must have been
followed by a refusal to provide information concerning the fate and
whereabouts of the victim.

299

At the time of writing, only one of the

forty-three students' remains has been positively identified.30 0 It took
six weeks before Mexican authorities could publicly comment
conclusively on the fate and whereabouts of the students. 301 The mayor
of Iguala fled shortly after the disappearanceS. 30 2 These facts support
the conclusion that much information about the whereabouts of the
students was withheld in the weeks following the disappearance of the
students. Indeed, a report by Proceso accuses federal authorities of
having hidden information regarding the whereabouts of the students
in the aftermath of Iguala.30 3 These facts, if true, would definitely
satisfy the element.
Other disappearance cases in Mexico where the victims remain
missing or were missing for several weeks would also likely satisfy this
element. More than twenty-seven thousand persons remain missing in
Mexico and 40 percent of those cases have never been investigated, 304
which evidences a regular failure on the part of the perpetrators to
provide information about where the victims are and whether they are
alive. Such cases would definitely satisfy the element.
The corresponding element in the Inter-American Convention is,
once again, broader than the element in the Rome Statute. It requires

298. Giorgou, supra note 296, at 1012.
299. Rome Statute, supra note 38, art. 7(2)(i).
300. See The Missing Forty-Three, supranote 5.
301. See Crisis in Mexico, supra note 280, at 1-2.
302. Id. at 2.
303. Proceso Report, supra note 14.
304. 2016 Al Report, supra note 6 ("Unfolding human rights crises at the national
level included Mexico, which was plagued by thousands of complaints of torture and
other ill-treatment and reports of extrajudicial executions; the whereabouts of at least
27,000 people remained unknown at the end of the year."); see also CONFRONTING A
NIGHTMARE, supra note 133, at 10-11.

20171

CONFRONTING MEXICO'S ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE MONSTERS

93

either (1) the absence of information or (2) the refusal to acknowledge
the deprivation of liberty or to give information about the whereabouts
of the victim.30 5 The IACtHR's focus on state human rights obligations
once again drives the court's analysis, 30 6 making it more concerned
with state omissions with respect to investigative and prosecutorial
diligence.3 07 The fact that the whereabouts of the victims are still
unknown is a factor that weighs heavily in favor of satisfying the
element. 308 Consequently, the disappearances in Iguala, as well as
many others, would satisfy the IACtHR formulation.
d. The Specific Intent Requirement
Lastly, in order to constitute an enforced disappearance under the
Rome Statute, the perpetrator must have had the specific intention of
removing the victim from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period.3 09 The inclusion of the term prolonged period does not require
the victim's actual removal for such a period, just an intention to do
so. 3 10 According to apprehended members of Guerreros Unidos, the
cartel went to great lengths to conceal the remains of the students from
discovery. They confessed to burning the bodies, breaking bones into
fragments, placing them in plastic bags, and tossing those bags in a
river.31 1 Even if they did not, in fact, burn the bodies at the Cocula
dump,3 12 some sort of practice was adopted to ensure the bodies would
not be discovered. The use of a sophisticated procedure, much like the
Stew Maker's dissolution of bodies in acid, strongly suggests an
intention to conceal the fate and whereabouts of the victims
permanently, not only to escape punishment, but also to hide such
details from the victims' families and friends as well as the broader
public. The mass graves discovered throughout the country further
evidence a pervasive intent to permanently conceal victims from the
protection of the law.31 3
As it is likely that all the chapeau requirements and elements of
the definition of enforced disappearance would be met, it is also likely
that the OTP would find the requisite material jurisdiction.

305. Inter-American Convention, supra note 40, art. 2.
306. Juan Luis Modollel Gonzdlez, The Crime of Forced Disappearanceof Persons
According to the Decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 10 INT'L CRIM.
L. REV. 475, 485-86 (2010).
307. See, e.g., Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico, supra note 278, Jf 17, 201, 230-34.
308. See id.
309. Rome Statute, supra note 38, art. 7(2)(i).
310. Modollel Gonzilez, supra note 306, at 485.
311. Crisis in Mexico, supranote 280.
312. Recall that the EAAF and the GIEI concluded just that. See EAAF Report,
supra note 17, ¶ 3; GIEI REPORT, supra note 17, at 307-31.
313. See, e.g., BORDERLAND BEAT Article, supra note 84.
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C. The Admissibility Requirement
In order for there to be a reasonable basis to believe that enforced
disappearances have or are being committed, the Prosecutor must also
consider whether the case(s) would be admissible under Article 53(1)(c)
of the Rome Statute. 314 The admissibility analysis is comprised of an
assessment of (1) gravity and (2) complementarity.3 15 This Section will
analyze each in turn, and ultimately conclude that both assessments
would support a finding of admissibility.
1. The Gravity Requirement
In order to satisfy the admissibility requirement, the conduct in
question must exceed a certain level of gravity.3 1 6 The rationale behind

this requirement is one of judicial economy: the court's resources
should not be expended on "minor" crimes. 317 According to the
Prosecutor, the gravity assessment entails a consideration of (a) the
scale of the crimes, (b) the nature of the crimes, (c) the manner in which
they are committed, and (d) their impact.31 8 This subsection will briefly
discuss each of these in turn, and ultimately conclude that they would
very easily be satisfied.
According to the OTP's recent policy paper on preliminary
examinations, the scale may be assessed in light of the number of direct
and indirect victims, the bodily and psychological harm caused to the
victims and their families, or their geographical or temporal spread. 319
Recall that the UNCED has concluded that there is a "generalized"
context of enforced disappearances in Mexico. 320 The more than
twenty-seven thousand people who have disappeared since 2006 and
who remain missing and the discovery of mass graves all over the
country speak to the vast number of victims and the geographic and
temporal spread of such acts. 32 1 The large number of family members
who have suffered as a result of this phenomenon only adds to the

314. Rome Statute, supra note 38, art. 53(1)(a); OTP Report, supranote 200, ¶ 3.
315. See Rome Statute, supra note 38, art. 17(1)(a)-(d); OTP Report, supranote 200, 1 5.
316. Rome Statute, supra note 38, art. 17(1)(d).
317. WERLE & JESSBERGER, supra note 243, at 103-04.
318. OTPReport, supranote 200, ¶ 7. The Pre-Trial Chamber has outlined a slightly
different analysis, which considers whether the behavior in question: (a) was systematic
or large scale, (b) led to "social alarm," and (c) involved the most senior leaders suspected
for being responsible for the crimes within the jurisdiction of the court. PROSECUTOR V.
DYILO, ICC-01/04-01/07, DECISION ON THE PROSECUTOR'S APPLICATION FOR WARRANTS

OF ARREST, ARTICLE 58, ¶¶ 43-64 (Feb. 10, 2006), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/
CR200700196.PDF [https://perma.cc/XQ8Q-QLEA] (archived Oct. 8, 2016).
319. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, POLICY PAPER
ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS, 1 62 (Nov. 2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/icedocs/otp/

OTP-PolicyPaperPreliminary Examinations 2013-ENG.pdf [https://perma.ce/R2U6VY5L] (archived Oct. 6, 2016) [hereinafter OTP Policy Paper].
320. UNCED Report, supra note 27, 1 10.
321. 2016 Al Report, supra note 6, at 249.
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scale. One of the survivors of the Iguala delegation that visited Leiden
University made the following concluding remark concerning the
psychological effect on victims' relatives: "[l]osing a family member to
natural causes feels truly terrible. Just imagine what it feels like when
you know that it was your own state [that was responsible]."322 Thus,
a situation in Mexico concerning enforced disappearances would have
the requisite scale.
The nature of the crimes would likewise support the finding of
gravity. According to the OTP, the nature of the crimes refers to the
specific elements of the offense. 323 As previously discussed, the
definition of enforced disappearance has a number of unique elements,
including the participation of state authorities, the intent to remove
the person from the protection of the law for an indefinite period, and
the purposeful refusal to provide information concerning the fate or
whereabouts of the victim. As one of the members of the Iguala
delegation remarked, "[o]ur classmates are not kidnapped . .. What
are [the perpetrators] asking for?" 324 What distinguishes enforced
disappearance from kidnapping or abduction, and what gives the crime
its international character, is the state's participation in the act and
interference with the truth. These aspects of the crime make it
especially heinous.
The manner of commission of these crimes likewise supports a
finding of gravity. The OTP has indicated that the analysis of this
factor should consider, among other things, (a) the means employed to
execute the crime, (b) the intent of the perpetrator, (c) the extent to
which the crimes were systematic, (d) or the presence of particular
cruelty. 325 Recall the creative and sophisticated means that many
perpetrators like the Stew Maker and the Guerreros Unidos employ in
order to avoid responsibility for the crime. The perpetrators intend for
their victims to remain missing indefinitely and use sophisticated
measures to ensure that they do. The pervasive intent to make victims
disappear entirely and the apparent, blatant disrespect for the victims'
bodies are a further testament to the gravity of the crime.
Finally, the impact of such crimes provides further support for a
finding of gravity. The OTP has indicated that such an impact may be
assessed in light of the social, economic, and environmental damage
inflicted on the affected communities, among other things. 326 The
Introduction and Part III discussed the resulting public distrust of the
Mexican criminal justice system and how that distrust further
increases impunity. Those discussions also referenced the horror
associated with not knowing which state authorities are serving the

322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Ayotzinapa in Leiden, supra note 18, at 2:32:00-2:34:00.
OTP Policy Paper, supra note 319, ¶ 63.
Ayotzinapa in Leiden, supra note 18, at 2:28:30-2:30:10.
OTP Policy Paper, supra note 319, ¶ 64.
Id. ¶ 65.
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country and which are serving the drug lords. These developments
have had a deleterious effect on the country socially, causing patterns
of forced displacement to avoid the drug violence 327 as well as a general
frustration with and disengagement from the criminal justice system.
Thus, the gravity requirement would very likely be met.
2. The Complementarity Analysis
As part of the admissibility analysis, the Prosecutor also considers
complementarity concerns. 328 The first question in assessing
complementarity is an empirical one: are there or have there been any
relevant national investigations or prosecutions? 329 Domestic
inactivity is sufficient to make a case admissible, and, in such a
scenario, the other questions of unwillingness or inability would not
arise. 330 Indeed, such a scenario likely exists, at least for the majority
of enforced disappearance crimes in Mexico. Because several Mexican
states do not criminalize enforced disappearance or employ definitions
that are compatible with international standards,3 3 ' a large portion of
enforced disappearance cases either cannot be prosecuted or would not
be prosecuted properly. The fact that around 40 percent of
disappearance cases have never been opened and that no one has been
convicted for an enforced disappearance committed after 2006 332
further suggest that a large portion of enforced disappearance crimes
would be admissible before the court.
It is also likely that many of the enforced disappearance cases that
are under investigation or that are being prosecuted would also be
deemed admissible. Where there are or have been national
investigations or prosecutions, the analysis focuses on whether those
national proceedings encompass the same person for the same conduct
as those to be investigated by the court.3 33 More precisely, ongoing
proceedings remain admissible if the state is or was "unwilling or
unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution." 334 For
a situation in Mexico, the analysis would deal more with
unwillingness, as inability relates more to whether the domestic
judicial system has substantially collapsed.3 35 Unwillingness may be

327. SebastiAn Albuja, Criminal Violence and Displacement in Mexico, 45 FORCED
MIGRATION R. 28, 28 (2014).
328. Rome Statute, supra note 38, arts. 17(1)(a)-(c), 53(1)(b); OTP Policy Paper,
supra note 319, ¶¶ 42, 46.
329. OTP Policy Paper, supra note 319, ¶ 47.
330. Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, supra note 198, ¶ 78.
331. UNCED Report, supra note 27, T 19-20.
332. CONFRONTING A NIGHTMARE, supra note 133, at 10-11; 2016 HRW Report,
supranote 6; 'Disappearances'ResponseFalls Short, supra note 128.
333. Rome Statute, supra note 38, art. 17(1)(a)-(c); OTP Policy Paper, supra note
319, 1¶ 47, 49.
334. Rome Statute, supra note 38, arts. 17(1), 20(3).
335. Id. art. 17(3).
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found, inter alia, where there has been an unjustified delay in the
judicial proceedings or if the proceedings are or were being undertaken
for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal
responsibility for Rome Statute crimes.336
With respect to unjustified delay, the Prosecutor looks to
indicators, such as the pace of investigative steps and whether there is
33 7
evidence of a lack of intent to bring the concerned persons to justice.
With respect to the intent to shield a person from criminal
responsibility, there are several relevant indicators, including (a)
insufficient steps in the investigation or prosecution, (b) ignoring
evidence or giving it insufficient weight, (c) intimidation of victims, and
8
(d) flawed or manipulated evidence. 33
Contrary to what the Mexican Foreign Ministry would have the
OTP believe, 33 9 there is ample evidence available for the Prosecutor to
conclude that there has been both an unjustifiable delay and an intent
to shield perpetrators of the crime. Recall the investigative failures
observed by the UNCED, UNWGEID, and multiple other human rights

NGOs:
(i)

unexplained delays in the initial following up on reported
disappearances;

(ii)

intentionally misinforming victim families that the law requires a
person to have been missing for several days before a formal complaint
may be filed;

(iii)

attributing blame to victims as a pretext for not opening investigations;

(iv)

routine failure to carry out basic investigative steps;

(v)

excessive reliance on families to carry out crucial investigative steps;

(vi)

misplacement, suppression, or destruction of key evidence; and

(vii) fabricating evidence.340

Not only do these shortcomings largely track the criteria identified
in the previous paragraph, but they also evidence a broader resistance
by Mexican law enforcement officials and prosecutors to follow through
with the investigation and prosecution of the crime. As a result of these
shortcomings, many families of victims are forced to drive such
investigations on their own initiatives, and, when they do, those

336. Id. art. 17(2); OTP Policy Paper, supra note 319, ¶ 50.
337. OTP Policy Paper, supra note 319, ¶ 52.
338. Id. ¶ 51.
339. See Press Release, Mexico Ministry of Foreign Relations, Comunicado 372
(Nov. 10, 2011) ¶¶ 5-6.
340. See, e.g., MEXIco's DISAPPEARED, supranote 100, at 34-67; UNWGEID Report,
supra note 96, ¶¶ 33-34.
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families often face threats of reprisal for trying to advance the case. 341
Whether it be for reasons of protecting the perpetrators or because of
lack of sufficient resources, or both, the reality on the ground is that
many of the ongoing proceedings suffer from avoidable delay or
purposeful evasion of investigation.
After considering both gravity and complementarity, it is likely
that the OTP would conclude that the particular case(s) would be
admissible.
D. The Interests of Justice
Finally, in order to initiate an investigation at the ICC, the OTP
must consider the interests of justice under Article 53(1)(c). 342 The
interest of justice assessment is a countervailing consideration that
may give reason not to proceed with an investigation. 343 There is a
strong presumption that investigations and prosecutions will be in the
interest of justice; a decision not to proceed on 53(1)(c) grounds would
be exceptional. 344 Thus, unless there is express resistance from the
victims or relevant intergovernmental organizations or NGOs, the
investigation will proceed. 345 Such a resistance does not exist at this
time in Mexico. To the contrary, the victims and relevant human rights
entities are desperately seeking the involvement of the court. 346
Although the Mexican government may resist international
involvement and advocate for more internal solutions, such
considerations do not form part of the analysis, and, even if they did,
they would not be enough to overcome the presumption.
Having examined all of the above factors, the OTP would indeed
find a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation in Mexico, even
if such an investigation involved only enforced disappearances.
V. How POSITIVE COMPLEMENTARITY COULD AID THE MEXICAN
REFORM PROCESS DURING A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION

Initiating an investigation before the ICC would exert pressure on
Mexican authorities to make further progress with respect to its
domestic reforms and, ultimately, to unearth some of the truth about
what happened to the many victims of enforced disappearance. Yet,
even before that investigation comes to fruition, the OTP has a

341. See MEXICO'S DISAPPEARED, supra note 100, at 34-67.
342. Rome Statute, supra note 38, art. 53(1)(c); OTP Policy Paper, supra note 319,
¶ 67.
343. OTP Policy Paper, supranote 319, ¶ 67.
344. Id. ¶ 71.
345. Id. ¶¶ 67-68.
346. See, e.g., CMDPH Letter, supra note 201; Ayotzinapa in Leiden, supranote 18,
at 2:26:00-2:27:00.
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powerful tool for fomenting and accelerating the Mexican domestic
reform process, namely its strategy of positive complementarity.
The meaning and scope of positive complementarity are still
evolving and remain debated among international criminal law
scholars. 347 Under the traditional complementarity principle, domestic
investigations and prosecutions should have priority over those of the

ICC.

348

Fulfillment of this principle

helps

avoid

simultaneous

'

proceedings in various courts concerning the same criminal acts. 349
The Rome Statute has several provisions that aim to protect this
arrangement. For example, under the statute, State Parties have
several positive obligations to ensure that they are able to conduct
investigations and proceedings independently.3 50 Likewise, the statute
also has provisions that allow for the ICC or the Prosecutor to
supervise the fulfillment of those obligations. 35
The notion of positive complementarity emerged as a means to
further ensure that domestic courts can meet their obligations. 352 The
OTP considers it an "approach" to the complementarity principle that
involves the encouragement of genuine national proceedings through
the OTP's cooperation with, and outreach to national authorities.35 3
This more collaborative notion of complementarity can be inferred from
the Rome Statute, which envisages "international cooperation" as a
means of enhancing the effective prosecution of international crimes
and regards the fight against impunity as a shared burden. 354
Historically, the OTP has envisioned the preliminary examination as
the "first opportunity" for the OTP to implement positive
complementarity; a5 5 however, its most recent formulation seems to
embrace a broader view, expanding the concept to include ICC support

347. See, e.g., Carsten Stahn, Taking Complementarity Seriously: On the Sense and
Sensibility of 'Classical', 'Positive' and 'Negative' Complementarity, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE

233, 233-36 (Carsten Stahn & Mohamed M. El Zeidy eds., 2011) [hereinafter Taking
Complementarity Seriously]; see generally William W. Burke-White, Proactive
Complementarity: The InternationalCriminal Court and National Courts in the Rome
System of InternationalJustice, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53, 53-108 (2008).
348. See Rome Statute, supranote 38, pmbl. to art. 1; CRYER ET AL., supra note 195,
at 536-67.
349. CRYER ET AL., supra note 195, at 536-67.
350. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supranote 38, art. 88 ("States Parties shall ensure that
there are procedures available under their national law for all the forms of cooperation
which are specified under [Part 9].").
351. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 38, art. 18, 11 2-3 ("At the request of [a]
State, the Prosecutor shall defer to the State's investigation . . . [but such a deferral]
shall be open to review by the Prosecutor . . . .").

352. See CRYER ET AL., supra note 195, at 536-67; Taking Complementarity
Seriously, supranote 347, at 233-35.
353. See OTP Prosecutorial Strategy, supranote 39, at 5.
354. See Rome Statute, supra note 38, pmbl. For a comprehensive treatment of this
argument, see A Tale of Two Notions, supra note 39, at 87-113.
355. OTP Prosecutorial Strategy, supra note 39, at 10.
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of global efforts to combat impunity for ICC crimes, irrespective of ICC
proceedings.35 6
This Part will argue that another reason for pursuing an ICC
investigation concerning enforced disappearances in Mexico is that the
OTP could use its positive complementarity strategy during the
preliminary examination to exert greater pressure on domestic
authorities to adopt appropriate criminal justice reforms. Such
pressure would likely accelerate the progress already being made and
bring Mexico closer to addressing its climate of impunity on its own.
This Part will be divided in two Sections. First, it will argue that
the mere threat of investigation has already contributed to domestic
reform in other countries, and thus that threat would likely aid the
reform process in Mexico. Drawing on the example of the situation in
Colombia, it will demonstrate that, over the course of the preliminary
examination, the OTP's evaluative process led to several advances with
respect to criminal law legislation, judicial willingness to prosecute
international crimes, and investigative and prosecutorial capacity.
Second, this Part will propose several specific measures that the OTP
could adopt to exert additional pressure on Mexican authorities. In
particular, it will suggest that the OTP could help expand existing
networks of cooperation, endorse or substantiate the investigative
efforts of human rights organizations and judicial bodies, and
encourage other international entities to be more proactive.
A. A Look at the Situation in Colombia: The Threat of an
Investigation Has Already Contributed to Domestic Reform Efforts.
The OTP's work in Colombia has been heralded by many as the
most successful example of positive complementarity in practice.35 7
Indeed, as this Section will demonstrate, it has contributed to
developments in three main areas: (i) improvements to existing
legislation, (ii) progressive shifts in the attitudes of judicial entities,
and (iii) shifts in investigative and prosecutorial priorities. These
developments highlight the impact that the threat of opening an
investigation in Mexico would likely have on the country's process of
realizing criminal justice reform.

356. See International Criminal Court & Office of the Prosecutor, Strategic Plan:
2016-2018, ¶f 95-97 (July 6, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/070715OTPStrategicPlan_2016-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/MJQ7-PTT8] (archived Oct. 5,
2016) [hereinafter 2015 Strategic Plan] (suggesting the implementation of global
information sharing centers and crime databases as well as capacity building).
357. See, e.g., Lionel Nichols, The Strategy of Positive Complementarity, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT & THE END OF IMPUNITY IN KENYA 29, 40 (2015);

Kirsten Ainley, The Responsibility to Protect and the International Criminal Court:
Counteractingthe Crisis, 91 INT'L AFF. 37, 48 (2015). For another example of success, see
Burke-White, supranote 347, at 71-73 (explaining that in 2005, the threat of prosecution
in Sudan provided a very visible influence over the willingness of domestic authorities
to prosecute international crimes themselves).
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Before beginning, it is important to acknowledge the difficulty in
demonstrating a direct causal link between the OTP's positive
complementarity strategy and the developments identified below. The
OTP has visited and corresponded with Colombian authorities on
many occasions 358 and has released a number of formal reports
detailing Colombia's progress and the OTP's contributions to that
progress.3so Such interactions definitely played a role in reinforcing
the threat of an investigation and incentivizing domestic authorities to
act. A notable recent development was the agreement between the
Government of Colombia and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
Colombia-Ej6rcito del Pueblo (FARC-EP) to create a "Special
Jurisdiction for Peace," which would allow the Chambers of Justice and
a Tribunal for Peace to prosecute and sanction those responsible for
several grave crimes committed during armed conflict. 360

However, positive complementarity was not the only force at work
in these developments. On the contrary, positive complementarity
formed part of a network of international efforts to engage with and
influence Colombian authorities. Other international organizations
and judicial bodies, most notably the IACtHR and human rights NGOs
like Amnesty International (AI) and HRW, were involved and
contributed to the momentum for change. 361 The important point is
that progress was made as a result of a collective pressure to which the
ICC contributed. Thus, at a minimum, the OTP's efforts indirectly led
to the changes discussed below.
The OTP's ongoing threat of opening an investigation played a role
in three positive developments in Colombia. First, the OTP's
involvement contributed to a number of improvements to existing
Colombian legislation. For example, throughout the preliminary
examination, the OTP indicated that it would be monitoring the

358. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, ICC Prosecutor Visits
Colombia, ICC-OTP-20080821-PR347 (Aug. 21, 2008) (https://www.ice-cpi.int/Pages/
item.aspx?name=icc%20prosecutor%20visits%20colombia [https://perma.cclC97Z-6CP2]
(archived Oct. 5, 2016)).
359. See, e.g., OTP Report, supra note 200, 1 ¶ 136-67.
360. See id. 11 141, 148-49.
361. See, e.g., Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations,
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No. 140, 11 177-93, 211-12 (Jan. 31,
2006), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_140-ing.pdf [https://perma
.cc/R9F7-ZJB7] (archived Oct. 5, 2016) (urging Colombian authorities to refine its
investigative and prosecutorial standards for extrajudicial executions and to reduce the
scope of its military criminal jurisdiction).
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implementation of the Justice and Peace Law 362 (JPL).363 This law was
negotiated in 2005 as part of Colombia's transitional justice process,
offering demobilized paramilitaries reduced prison sentences in
exchange for a full confession of their crimes and their cooperation in
other investigations. 364 Following its passage, the law received much
scrutiny due to excessive delays in JPL proceedings. 3 6 5 The year 2012
was marked by several legislative changes meant to improve the JPL
framework. For example, the Colombian legislature passed Law
1592, 366 which introduced several procedural changes aimed at
making the JPL process more efficient, such as anticipated judgments
for those paramilitaries with more lead responsibility. 367 Another
legislative development bearing the mark of the OTP's involvement is
the Legal Framework for Peace3 68 (LFP). This law includes a strategy
of prioritization and selection of cases against non-paramilitaries,
focusing on those most responsible for the commission of several crimes
under ICC jurisdiction and allowing for the conditioned dropping of
non-selected cases. 369 Although the law as it stands may indeed create

362.
Ley 975 de 2005, julio 25, 2005, 45.980 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O] (Colom.). For a
thorough review of the substance of this law, see KAI AMBOS, THE COLOMBIAN PEACE
PROCESS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

COURT (2010); see also ICC's Principle of Complementarity, in 2 THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT & COMPLEMENTARITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 1071, 1071-96

(Carsten Stahn & Mohamed M. El Zeidy eds., 2011).
363. See, e.g., ALEJANDRO CHEHTMAN, THE IMPACT OF THE ICC IN COLOMBIA:
POSITIVE COMPLEMENTARITY ON TRIAL 21 (Oct. 2011), http://www.domac.is/medial

domac-skjol/Domac-17-AC.pdf [https://perma.cc/54FE-828L (archived Oct. 5, 2016)
(describing a letter from the OTP indicating that it would monitor whether the JPL
complied with the requirements of "truth, justice, and reparations"); SHAW DRAKE, THE
COURT's ROLE IN PROMOTING ACCOUNTABILITY IN COLOMBIA'S TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

FRAMEWORK 4 (June 19, 2014), http://www.amice.org/docs/Colombia%20and%20the
%20ICC.pdf [https:/perma.cc/B6CR-GMCV] (archived Oct. 5, 2016) (discussing two
letters sent in July and August of 2013 warning the judicial branch of Colombia that
certain provisions of the LFP, if left unchanged may result in the initiation of an
investigation).
364. Feature Series: Colombia's Justice and Peace Process, ICTJ (May 8, 2012),
https://www.ictj.org/news/feature-series-colombiaE2%80%99s-justice-and-peaceprocess [https:l/perma.cclXXB4-N4B8] (archived Oct. 5, 2016).
365. See id. (noting that more than 2,000 demobilized paramilitaries were still
awaiting trial and only seven cases had ever reached a verdict as of March 2012).
366. Ley 1592 de 2012, diciembre 25, 2005, 48.633 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O] (Colom.).
367. Inter-Am. Comm'n on Human Rights, Truth, Justice, and Reparation:Fourth
Report on Human Rights Situation in Colombia, OEA/Er.L/V/II, Doc. 49/13 11 310, 361
(Dec.
31,
2013)
[hereinafter
Truth,
Justice,
and Reparation
Report],
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Colombia-Truth-Justice-Reparation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2MC6-6XAP] (archived Oct. 5, 2016).
368. Acto Legislativo No. 1 de 2012, julio 31, 2012, "Por medio del cual se
estabelecen instrumentos juridicos de justicia transicional en el marco del articulo 22 de
la Constituci6n Politica y se dictan otras disposiciones" (Cong. de la Repdblica de
Colom.).
369. Int'l Criminal Court & The Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Colombia:
Interim Report I]¶ 204-05, 221 (Nov. 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/
3D3055BD-16E2-4C83-BA85-35BCFD2A7922/285102/OTPCOLOMBIAPublicInterim
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3 70
the
concerns about the investigation of low- to mid-level offenders,
step
legislative
a
major
constitutes
passage of the law nonetheless
towards the country being able to prosecute international crimes on its
37 1
own and to properly prioritize cases in line with OTP goals.
Second, the OTP's involvement has also triggered a shift in
attitudes among Colombian courts towards greater recognition of
international crimes and international criminal law standards.
Colombia has not yet adopted a law implementing the Rome Statute
and has only sparingly included crimes that would qualify as crimes
against humanity in its criminal code 372 -which does not include a
definition of crimes against humanity. 373 However, within the last
decade, many Colombian courts have begun to interpret and apply
international criminal law, even in the absence of relevant domestic
law codifying it. For example, in 2010, the Colombian Supreme Court
recognized responsibility for genocide, despite the fact that the conduct
in question occurred prior to the implementation of domestic laws
criminalizing the act. 374 Since roughly the time that the OTP began its
preliminary examination, domestic courts have also begun to apply
international criminal law concerning other crimes against
humanity.3 75 Similarly, in 2010, the Supreme Court embraced modes
of liability from international criminal law, 376 and some domestic
courts have followed suit, embracing the concept of "co-perpetrationby-means."37 7
Finally, the OTP's involvement has played a role in the
adjustment of investigative and prosecutorial priorities so as to
facilitate the investigation of international crimes. For example, the
organizational structure of the JPL Unit of the Attorney General's
Office in Colombia has been redesigned to facilitate greater
consideration of evidence fulfilling the chapeau requirements for

ReportNovember2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/29M2-YZ4R] (archived Oct. 5, 2016).
370. Id. 1 205.
371. International Criminal Court & Office of the Prosecutor, Strategic Plan June
2012-2015, ¶¶ 19, 22 (Oct. 11, 2013), https://www.ice-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-StrategicPlan-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/SA8R-5RQY] (archived Oct. 5, 2016) (detailing the
OTP's prioritization of investigations of the most responsible persons for crimes under
the jurisdiction of the court).
372. U.S. LIBRARY OF CONG., CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY STATUTES AND CRIMINAL
CODE PROVISIONS IN SELECTED JURISDICTIONS, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/

crimes-against-humanitylindex.php (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/
6BWW-TEMY] (archived Oct. 5, 2016) (noting that the Colombia Criminal Code only
accounts for genocide, forced disappearances, kidnapping, arbitrary detention, torture,
forced displacement, and crimes of terrorism).
373. CHEHTMAN, supra note 363, at 48.
374. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Penal. marzo 11,
2012 (No. 33301, pp. 33-35) (Colom.)
375. See CHEHTMAN, supra note 363, at 43-44.
376. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Penal. febrero 23,
2010 (No. 32805, pp. 77-78) (Colom.)
377. See CHEHTMAN, supra note 363, at 44.
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crimes against humanity.3 78 Accordingly, prosecutors within the Unit
are no longer divided by case, but rather by geographic location, which
has already enabled the Unit to more readily identify systematic
patterns of criminality.3 79 Similarly, the National Unit of Analysis of
the Attorney General's Office adopted a four-phase method to help link
specific cases to more general patterns of criminality.38 0 As a result of
this initiative, the National Unit was able to reassign 133 cases
involving crimes that formed part of a larger criminal enterprise, 35 1
thereby consolidating various open investigations.
Collectively these developments demonstrate that the OTP's
positive complementarity strategy has contributed to strides at the
legislative, judicial, and administrative levels, the same three areas
that Mexico is currently attempting to reform. The example of
Colombia highlights just how influential the mere threat of an ICC
investigation can be in accelerating the domestic reform process. At a
minimum, positive complementarity provides an additional avenue
through which to apply pressure to domestic authorities to enhance
their national criminal justice systems. The above gains provide an
additional reason to pursue an investigation at the ICC.
B. Positive Complementarity in Mexico: Three Innovative Measures
that the OTP Could Adopt During a PreliminaryExamination
The example of Colombia illustrates the impact that even just the
threat of an investigation may have on the domestic reform process.
However, in the case of Mexico, and in general, the OTP need not limit
its positive complementarity efforts to the mere threat of an
investigation. Indeed, the OTP has recently acknowledged the
importance of strengthening international networks during the
preliminary examination phase. 38 2 If such coordinated investigative
and prosecutorial efforts are to be realized, the OTP must be at the
forefront of them. The international community will look to the OTP to
take action.
Bearing the importance of such leadership in mind, this Section
proposes three proactive measures that the OTP could take as part of
a positive complementarity strategy during a preliminary examination

378. Id. at 39-40.
379. See id.
380. Truth, Justice, and Reparation Report, supra note 367, ¶ 381, 165 n.643.
381. Id. ¶ 381.
382. See 2015 Strategic Plan, supra note 356, 11 72-73 ("The Office will continue to
facilitate cooperation in relation to its preliminary examinations, investigations and
trials in two ways: (1) by ensuring that there is strategic and operational advice and
cooperation support available to integrated teams . . . and (2) by consolidating and
further expanding the Office's network of general and operational focal points and
judicial actors, and streamlining and standardizing processes and interactions with
partners.").
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in Mexico and explains how the measures could impact the domestic
criminal justice reform process. The three measures are as follows: (1)
expand networks of cooperation beyond the ICC and domestic
authorities, (2) endorse and substantiate the investigative efforts of
human rights organizations and judicial bodies, and (3) inspire other
international bodies and organizations to apply further pressure on
domestic authorities to enact appropriate reforms. The more pressure
the OTP exerts on Mexican authorities to reform the criminal justice
system, the greater the likelihood that Mexico will adopt timely
reforms.
Before discussing these three measures, it is important to explain
how they would be consistent with the Rome Statute. Following that
discussion, this Section will then discuss how the three measures
would exert greater pressure on Mexican authorities to enact reform.
1. How the Measures Adhere to the Rome Statute
The proposed measures all share a common theme: the ICC
engaging with entities aside from the domestic entities directly
involved in the preliminary examination. Although the OTP has not
yet adopted such measures in practice, the broader goals of the ICC
and several provisions in the Rome Statute would not preclude the
OTP from taking such initiatives. For one, the Preamble of the Rome
Statute makes clear that the effective prosecution of international
crimes "must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and
by enhancing international cooperation." 383 Thus, the Preamble
envisages the fight against impunity as being a shared burden-one
that is not limited to the ICC or domestic courts alone.
Moreover, a number of provisions in the Rome Statute bestow
upon the Prosecutor broad discretion in how to go about ensuring the
effectiveness and genuineness of domestic investigations and
prosecutions in states under preliminary examination. For example,
Article 54(3)(d) allows the Prosecutor to "enter into such arrangements
or agreements . . . as may be necessary to facilitate the cooperation of
a State." 384 Similarly, Article 93(10) recognizes that the court may
assist a State Party conducting an investigation or trial through
cooperation, if so requested by the State Party.38 5 It provides a nonexhaustive list of the forms of cooperation.386 It may be inferred from
such broad language that the OTP is free to pursue different
approaches to help states under preliminary examination overcome
shortcomings in their domestic criminal proceedings, including
engagement with other international bodies and entities.

383.
384.
385.
386.

Rome Statute, supra note 38, pmbl.
Id. art. 54, ¶ 3(d).
Id. art. 93, ¶ 10.
Id.
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Indeed, the Rome Statute seems to encourage the OTP to embrace
measures not expressly mentioned in the statute, so long as they serve
the goals of the ICC. For example, Article 93(10)(l) allows for "any other
type of assistance .

.

. with a view to facilitating the investigation and

prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court." 387
Similarly, Articles 53(1)(b) and 53(2)(b) give the Prosecutor discretion
to continue evaluating admissibility under Article 17(1) up through the
investigation phase of proceedings. 388 These two sub-articles
presuppose that certain states will initially be unable or unwilling to
prosecute during the preliminary examination phase. Thus, they not
only validate the Prosecutor's ongoing evaluation of domestic
proceedings, but they also imply that, during that evaluative process,
the Prosecutor may adopt measures that would contribute to a new
willingness or capacity to prosecute.3 89
2. How the Measures Could Exert Additional Pressure
The first measure that the OTP could take during the preliminary
examination is to expand networks of cooperation beyond merely the
ICC and domestic authorities. One of the major problems in Mexico is
the lack of consensus regarding the actual number of disappearances
in the country and which disappearances would qualify as enforced
disappearances. As the OTP gathers public information regarding
potential instances of enforced disappearance in the country, it could
also facilitate a dialogue between national human rights NGOs, such
as the CMDPH, and international organizations, such as AI and HRW,
that have been documenting cases of enforced disappearance. It could
also invite domestic agencies charged with making such estimates to
share their numbers and engage in more collective efforts to track the
enforced disappearance phenomenon.
Through such dialogues, the OTP could help produce more
accurate estimates as to the number of enforced disappearances in the
country, both for the public and for the purposes of the preliminary
examination. The OTP has already suggested various tools for
information sharing with third parties to help address impunity in
general 390 and it need only apply such ideas in practice during
preliminary examinations. The mere existence of such collaboration
alone would put Mexican legislators in a difficult position: they would
need to either adopt appropriate reform to improve Mexico's ability to

387. Id. ¶ 10(1).
388. Id. arts. 17, ¶ 1, 53 1 1(b), 53, 1 2(b).
389. See Burke-White, supra note 347, at 81.
390. See 2015 Strategic Plan, supra note 356, ¶¶ 95-96 (proposing the following
measures: building a global database in which practitioners can share their experiences,
developing a common crime database, creating a platform for the exchange of
confidential information related to the investigation of international crimes, and
encouraging third parties to help develop domestic prosecutorial capacity).
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contribute to such efforts or oppose that reform and risk being
perceived as having motives to shield the perpetrators. Likewise, such
efforts would be consistent with the broader goals of ensuring effective
domestic proceedings, as they would contribute both directly and
indirectly to a comprehensive mapping of the totality of the enforced
disappearances in the country, revealing the true extent of systematic
patterns across the country.
The second measure that the OTP could adopt is to expressly
endorse or corroborate findings reached in the reports of human rights
bodies or organizations, thereby adding weight and legitimacy to them.
Recall the UNCED's recent report regarding enforced disappearances
in Mexico and the Mexican government's rejection of several of the
report's recommendations, including numerous proposed responses to
the persistence of domestic investigative shortcomings.39 1 As the OTP
is examining the effectiveness of domestic investigative efforts for the
purposes of the admissibility analysis, it could expressly state that it
supports the findings and recommendations contained in the UNCED
report. Moreover, it could substantiate those findings by drawing on
other human rights reports, like the 2013 HRW report. By legitimizing
the findings reached in both reports, the OTP would likely increase the
pressure on Mexican authorities to respond accordingly, again making
it more difficult for Mexican lawmakers to resist reform. If the OTP
were to open an investigation in Mexico, the OTP could then actually
supplement the findings produced in such reports with its own
findings, adding further weight to existing reports. These sorts of
efforts to bolster the work of other international entities would not only
increase pressure on Mexican authorities, but they would also be in
line with the goals of the statute, as they would be contributing to the
development of a new willingness and capacity to prosecute
international crimes domestically.
The third and final measure that the OTP could adopt is to inspire
other international organizations and bodies to exert pressure on the
Mexican government. More precisely, by becoming more proactively
involved in a particular aspect of Mexico's reform process, the OTP may
encourage other international entities to also become more proactive
in the reform process or to reinforce the ICC's efforts. Recall the change
of attitudes by Colombian courts towards the interpretation and
application of international criminal law. The OTP was not acting
alone in attempting to trigger those developments. During the same
period, the IACtHR had also advocated for national supreme courts to
develop doctrines that would allow courts to apply international norms

391. Government MinistriesQuestioned the United Nations Report that Is Damning
Over Government Practices,TELESUR (Feb. 14, 2015), http://www.telesurtv.net/
english/newsMexico-Govt-Rejects-UN-Report-on-Enforced-Disappearances-201502140016.html [https://perma.cclTUJ3-LSPH] (archived Oct. 5, 2016).
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and standards. 392 It is difficult to know whether the OTP or the
IACtHR was the first to exert such pressure, but the point is that the
OTP's more pronounced involvement on an issue could generate
"spillover effects," inspiring other international or regional entities to
engage in such issues, to reinforce the efforts of the ICC, or to expose
other issues. By increasing or intensifying the "pressure points" in this
way, the OTP would also be contributing to a new domestic willingness
and capacity to effectively prosecute.
It is necessary to address one important counter argument to the
OTP taking a more proactive approach towards domestic reform in
Mexico, namely concerns about state sovereignty. Like many Latin
American countries, Mexico values non-interference in its domestic
affairs.3 93 As mentioned in the previous Section, Mexican authorities
have opposed the intervention of the ICC in the past.394 Thus, it is very
likely that the Mexican government would perceive the presence of the
ICC and its efforts to mobilize international cooperation as
interference into a matter of domestic concern.
This subsection does not mean to endorse the unrestrained
expansion of the notion of positive complementarity; rather, it has
proposed various measures that remain rooted in one of the express
purposes of the ICC, namely to ensure the effective investigation and
prosecution
of international
crimes
through
international
cooperation.3 95 As previously shown, various provisions in the Rome
Statute encourage the Prosecutor to take great liberties in aiding
states under preliminary examination to overcome shortcomings in
their domestic criminal proceedings. Positive complementarity is
meant to be a tool for enhancing a state's criminal justice efforts, when
such enhancement is merited.
As demonstrated in Parts II and III, Mexico suffers from several
appalling shortcomings in its investigation and prosecution of enforced
disappearances. Those shortcomings have resulted in a pervasive
pattern of state officials intentionally impeding the completion of such
proceedings-a pattern that domestic reform efforts have been unable
to correct or address. Such a perverse and blanket denial of justice
embodies the kind of impunity that justifies international involvement
and cooperation. The Rome Statute recognizes that there are limits to

392.
See, e.g., Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, ¶ 129 (Sept. 26,
2006) (calling for the applicability of crimes against humanity notwithstanding domestic
legislation which allowed for amnesty from prosecution for such crimes); Marino Lopez
et al. (Operation Genesis), Case No. 12.573, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 64/11,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 ¶ 240 (2011) (applying the principle of distinction from
international humanitarian law).
393. See Martha L. Cottman & Otwin Marenin, InternationalCooperation in the
War on Drugs: Mexico and the United States, 9 POLICING & Soc'Y 209, 218 (1999).
394. Comunicado 372, supra note 339, 11 3, 5-6.
395. See Rome Statute, supra note 38, pmbl.
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the principle of state sovereignty, but the case of Mexico illustrates a
scenario in which the international community should be more
engaged in a state's efforts to address impunity.
VI. CONCLUSION

In the coming years, Mexico will have to confront a number of
enforced disappearance monsters, both literal and metaphorical. This
Article touched on several of these monsters in Parts II and III: the
the
perpetrators and accomplices of these egregious acts,
indeterminate scope of this "generalized" behavior, the relatively slow
progress in enacting crucial reforms to the Mexican criminal justice
system, the investigative shortcomings of state authorities, the
pervasive resolve to shield perpetrators, and the increasing
deterioration of public faith in domestic criminal justice institutions.
Mexico is a long way from being able to effectively confront these
various monsters on its own, but international institutions can play a
vital role in accelerating Mexico's domestic reform process.
This Article has proposed one avenue through which the
international community could help Mexico realize such reform,
namely the pursuit of an ICC investigation. Part IV explained the
feasibility of the OTP opening an investigation in Mexico, if a
preliminary examination were initiated. It is important to note that
the likelihood of opening such an investigation would increase
substantially if the OTP considered other international crimes apart
from just enforced disappearances. Thus, contrary to what some may
argue, the threat of opening an investigation is very real. Part V
identified an additional, and important, justification for pursuing an
investigation at the ICC: the likely impact that the OTP's positive
complementarity strategy would have on Mexico's criminal justice
reform process. Opening an ICC investigation would in itself greatly
reinforce the threat of having a case brought before the ICC, however
the OTP should not stop there. The three measures proposed in this
Article, if adopted, would only exert additional pressure on Mexican
authorities and further accelerate the reform process in Mexico.
This Article is meant to initiate a broader dialogue about how the
ICC should continue to evolve in order to respond to several new
challenges in international criminal justice, particularly the rise of
non-state actors. The phenomenon of enforced disappearances and the
monsters associated with it will likely continue to be a challenge in the
coming decades. It is only a matter of time before the ICC will be forced
to confront the problem more directly. This Article has suggested that
the ICC should play a leading role in broader international efforts to
influence the domestic criminal justice reform process where merited.
The OTP's positive complementarity strategy could and should be used
in tandem with the efforts of other international and regional bodies
seeking to contribute to a country's progress in effectively prosecuting
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international crimes. It will certainly take time to reconceptualize the
role of the ICC into a more proactive variant-indeed, there are limits
to the notion of positive complementarity and practical impediments to
achieving such a transformation. But, as the preliminary examination
in Colombia demonstrates, even the slightest contributions to domestic
reform may ultimately trigger waves of progress.
Mas vale algo que nada (Something is worth more than
nothing).
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Figure 1. The Life Cycle of Crimes in Mexico
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Source: CLAIRE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43001,
SUPPORTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM IN MEXICO: THE U.S. ROLE 3 (2013).

Note: This graphic is presented to give an idea of how few crimes reach the
sentencing stage in Mexico. It depicts data from before the 2008 reform,
though roughly the same proportion of cases reach sentencing now.
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Perceptions of the Frequency of Corruption in
Figure 2.
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